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ExECUTIvE SUmmARy
 
Border areas are sites of intensive interaction between states and inter-
regional business. Political tensions and armed conflicts have a particularly 
strong impact on trade flows. In fragile and conflict-affected settings (FCAS), 
where states have limited power and where the enforcement of laws, rules and 
regulations is weak, irregular economies tend to thrive along borders, where 
state officials often deal with border formalities in arbitrary ways. This 
Working Paper focuses on transporters, i. e. hauliers, as important actors in the 
border areas between Afghanistan and its neighbours Pakistan and Iran. The 
transport sector is sensitive to market fluctuations and a volatile business 
environment, reacting strongly with increasing or declining employment. 
This study addresses the question of how haulage companies and workers 
operate in an insecure environment as found in the border areas of FCAS and 
identifies strategies for conflict-sensitive employment. Based on the analysis 
of academic studies, bilateral treaties and their implementation, media reports 
and interviews with owners and managers of haulage companies and small 
hauliers, drivers and labourers, this Working Paper presents the particularities 
of formal and informal trade in the border areas of Afghanistan. A major 
finding is that states, large companies, small transporters and workers greatly 
differ in their perceptions of violent conflict, which range from views of 
alarming insecurity to regarding it as negligible. Moreover, businessmen tend 
to perceive corrupt practices by state officials and the police as a source of 
more uncertainty than acts by non-state armed groups. A third insight is that 
Pakistan and Iran consider cross-border trade with Afghanistan a minor issue 
as both states are pursuing particular interests in the larger region. Pakistan’s 
tense relationship with India and Iran’s struggle with Western sanctions 
inform the trade strategies of these countries, while Afghanistan is a marginal 
player in these power struggles. Some conflict-sensitive employment 
strategies, such as employing drivers and assistants according to cultural 
criteria to facilitate safe passage through areas under the control of various 
power holders and affected by violent conflict are adopted by cross-border 
haulage companies out of self-interest. The paper presents additional 
strategies that major companies can use.
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Pakistan’s trade with Afghanistan  
has shifted largely to informal  
cross-border business; Iran has  
become Afghanistan’s main importer  
in official trade.
Obstacles to and restrictions on the official trade 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan, mainly caused by 
political and diplomatic tensions, have led to border 
skirmishes, frequent closings of the border, and the 
construction of fences and gates. Lengthy delays 
 facing trucks at the border have caused great losses 
for exporting and transport companies. The decline 
in official trade has caused two major changes: 
   \ a significant increase in informal trade 
between the two countries, involving many 
SMEs and workers in small-scale transport 
activities, and
   \ the rise of Iran—which has also increased its 
exports to Afghanistan—to the status of 
Afghanistan’s biggest importer in 2016. 
Afghanistan’s neighbours see ‘illegal 
economies’ in the border areas as 
drivers of conflict. 
Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) benefit from contra-
band, the trafficking in arms, drugs and human 
beings and raise protection money from haulage 
companies moving through territories along the 
borders. From the perspective of the governments in 
the region, this undermines the legitimacy of their 
rule and state effectiveness, in particular with regard 
to tax collection and customs duties but also to the 
provision of safety and security to the population and 
private enterprises.
Actions by government officials, 
officers, and international troops have 
contributed to a thriving irregular 
border economy.
Whereas officially, governments condemn the irregu-
larities along the border, individuals make use of 
lucrative business opportunities arising from the 
persistence of a war economy. Aid agencies and inter-
national troops have contributed to the current prob-
lems. During the boom period between 2002 and 2012, 
they strengthened the irregular border economy and, 
ultimately, insecurity by paying NSAGs for convoy 
protection and by gaining customs exemptions for 
supplies of arms, vehicles, fuel and other items 
imported for their needs. What we find here is a 
mutually reinforcing relationship between the thriv-
ing of irregular economies and the lack of justice and 
of the rule of law.
Large transport companies use  
various conflict-sensitive business and 
employment strategies while informal 
hauliers do not apply conflict-sensitive 
employment.
Large international haulage companies adapt to the 
conditions of the fragile and conflict-affected settings 
(FCAS) at the borders by putting funds aside for bribes 
and hiring drivers and assistants able to negotiate 
passage in difficult areas. Informal transporters have 
to cope with a multitude of existential problems, of 
which violent conflict is a minor one. They struggle 
to fend for themselves as there are no formal corpo-
rate structures, and policies are poorly implemented.
main findings
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Introduction1
The ‘Afghanistan National Peace and Development 
Framework (ANPDF) 2017 to 2021’ lays out the govern-
ment of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s 
(GIRoA) five-year plan for achieving self-reliance in 
line with the government’s proclaimed overarching 
goal (Office of the Deputy Minister for Policy, Minis-
try of Finance, GIRoA, 2016). The framework high-
lights the steps the GIRoA intends to take towards a 
“productive and broad-based economy that creates 
jobs (…) (and to) establish the rule of law and put an 
end to corruption, criminality, and violence” (GIRoA, 
2017, p. 1). Economic growth is the key to reaching 
these aims. The government emphasizes that inter- 
regional trade is one of the “long-run drivers of 
growth … (provided) the old ways (are) (…) modern-
ized” (GIRoA, 2017, p. 4). ‘The old ways’ include numer-
ous “red tape-driven obstacles” (GIRoA, 2017, p. 19) 
with regard to border and customs clearance proce-
dures, licensing and registration, as well as weak-
nesses in the transport and logistics sector (GIRoA, 
2017, p. 22). Currently, Afghanistan’s imports (exclud-
ing military imports) are ten times higher than its 
exports (GIRoA, 2017, p. 19), pointing to quite intensive 
but more or less one-directional cross-border trans-
ports from neighbouring states into Afghanistan.
The ANPDF portrays Afghanistan as a potential 
“transit hub between East, South, Central and West 
Asia (…) provided conflict risks are reduced to man-
ageable levels” (GIRoA, 2017, p. 24) and provided that 
finance can be secured. Regional railways and roads 
are planned to link Afghanistan with Central Asia 
and Iran for commercial freight and mineral ship-
ments on diversified export routes. Towards this end, 
the ANPDF aims to improve economic cooperation 
with the neighbouring states by advancing bilateral 
and multilateral trade agreements, cementing agree-
ments between the customs authorities on each side 
of the border and by strengthening the commercial 
attachés in the Afghan embassies (GIRoA, 2017, p. 22). 
More concretely, the government intends to improve 
access to tailored trade support services, implement 
1 \  We are very grateful to Carina Schlüsing, Conrad Schetter and Dirk 
Hansohm for valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper. This 
said, the sole responsibility for the contents and any errors that might 
have occurred lies with the authors.
the Customs Convention on International Transport 
of Goods under Cover of TIR Carnets, and open “one-
stop shops offering streamlined electronic business 
administration services (registration, licensing, cus-
toms payments) in Kabul and seven hubs” (GIRoA, 
2017, p. 22). These measures have the potential to facil-
itate cross-border transportation, which is one of the 
mainstays of trade flows. They address the routine 
operations of haulage companies and related firms, 
such as those involved in customs clearing (for-
warder companies), that also affect employees and 
workers, such as drivers or loaders.
What is called ‘transportation sector’ in this 
paper comprises haulage companies as well as 
importers running their own truck fleet, forwarder 
companies, drivers, loaders, painters, mechanics, site 
supervisors, and many other occupations, which 
relate to transportation and logistics. Hence, the 
transportation sector is part of the ‘broad-based econ-
omy that creates jobs’ the GIRoA intends to establish. 
Implementation of the aims stated in the ANPDF, 
however, requires detailed knowledge of daily routine 
particulars of Afghan cross-border operations, how 
employees and workers manage them, and of their 
experiences with and perceptions of what the GIRoA 
calls ‘conflict risks’. Moreover, tailoring implementa-
tion so that it will have an impact on employment 
needs detailed information about employment and 
recruitment, labour conditions, training opportuni-
ties and career prospects in the transportation sector. 
Last but not least, the effectiveness of the ANPDF will 
depend on the government authorities’ ability to 
enforce it.
This Working Paper provides the context within 
which the measures of the ANPDF are supposed to 
materialise, focussing on employment in cross-bor-
der transport and possibilities to make employment 
more meaningful and sustainable. The authors con-
ducted interviews with individuals from different 
sections of the transportation sector in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan and Iran to shed light on how haulage 
 companies and workers operate in an insecure envi-
ronment. The study tries to assess whether employ-
ment strategies in the transportation sector contrib-
ute to violent conflict or reduce it, and under which 
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conditions the sector has the potential to absorb 
larger numbers of unemployed youth and provide 
them with a perspective. Based on the findings from 
empirical research and relevant literature, the aim of 
this paper is to develop the components needed to 
create conflict-sensitive employment in companies 
that conduct cross-border trade.
The first chapter outlines the concept of con-
flict-sensitive employment and the methodology 
used. Subsequently, an overview of the context in 
which cross-border transport has been operating 
since 2001 is provided, considering the impact of 
trade fluctuations, bilateral trade agreements and  
the factors driving irregular trade in the context of 
armed conflicts between 2001 and 2017. After that, 
insights from field research (2015–2016) on how 
 transport companies conduct cross-border trade, on 
their employment strategies and perceptions of inse-
curity are laid out. Then, the experiences of workers, 
employees and sub-contractors, their perceptions and 
attempts at dealing with risks occurring in their field 
of work are presented. A chapter containing an analy-
sis of the findings regarding the effects of employ-
ment strategies on violent conflict is followed by 
some general conclusions.
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Conflict-sensitive employment requires the creation 
of meaningful jobs that provide prospects for individ-
uals and counter divisive effects in communities in 
fragile and conflict-affected settings (FCAS). FCAS are 
defined as settings, in which the political environ-
ment is extremely polarized and divided due to a  
lack of trust among political actors. FCAS thus are 
characterized by “low social cohesion and a lack of 
consensus on what organising principles should 
determine the contest for state power and how that 
power should be implemented” (NIMD, 2016). FCAS 
mostly have regional and international dimensions 
and affect cross-border trade by irregular economies 
extending into neighbouring countries. Distrust and 
social divisions, as well as remnants of war econo-
mies, thus affect the societies on both sides of inter-
national borders. 
Conflict-sensitivity ultimately requires that 
employment practices do not cause or exacerbate 
conflict. Employees, employers and governments or 
any other organization controlling an area in a coun-
try with the structures of an FCAS need agreements 
towards this aim and clear procedures that every 
party can rely on. In FCAS where patronage relations 
shape society, there may be various groups of employ-
ees, employers and either government or other 
 controlling group representatives that make their 
agreements in parallel networks. These can include 
procedures for labour recruitment that are sensitive 
to local conflict dynamics and contexts, or provisions 
for training opportunities, adequate wage levels and 
labour conditions, among others. In addition, con-
flict-sensitive business and employment practices 
must be a matter of bilateral negotiations between 
neighbouring states, regional investors and employ-
ers with international branches. The widespread 
practice to preferably employ foreigners rather than 
locals, often exerted by international agencies and 
companies, will require changes if conflict-sensitivity 
is the aim (Grawert et al., 2017).
methodology 
The research was conducted in Afghanistan, Pakistan 
and Iran to understand the employment trends, 
practices and strategies adopted by Pakistani and 
Iranian companies engaged in cross-border trade and 
transportation. In addition to Pakistani and Iranian 
companies, Afghan companies with offices and sites 
in the neighbouring countries were included in the 
research. Within Pakistan, qualitative research was 
carried out in Lahore, Karachi and Peshawar. In 
Afghanistan, the team worked in Herat and Kabul; 
and in Iran, in Mashhad and Tehran. The qualitative 
research was based on key informant interviews and 
focus group discussions carried out between August 
and October 2016 as well as between January and May 
2016 in Pakistan, between April 2015 and November 
2016 in Afghanistan and in October 2015 as well as in 
March 2016 in Iran.
In Pakistan, the research team conducted eight 
key informant interviews with representatives of 
transport companies operating between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. The interview partners were mostly 
working as mid-level managers. Their companies had 
between five and over 200 permanent staff members. 
As the informants were hesitant to disclose the 
annual turnover of the companies, the size of their 
businesses cannot be stated exactly. Three of them 
had offices in Peshawar and four in Karachi. Four 
companies had offices in Afghanistan (mostly Kabul) 
while the others worked through associates and affil-
iates. Three companies were primarily hauliers of 
commercial products, one mostly provided logistics 
for the United States Agency for International Devel-
opment (USAID), the US Army and NATO forces, while 
the remaining companies transported both commer-
cial and non-commercial products for NATO and the 
US Army. The research team also held expert discus-
sions with a representative of the Afghan–Pakistani 
Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industries in Kabul.
To understand the experiences of workers and 
small-scale entrepreneurs active in the transport 
sector, the team interviewed 40 employees and 
self-employed persons involved in cross-border trans-
port in Peshawar, focussing on their risk perception 
and strategies in dealing with risks related to vio-
lence and uncertainties in the border area between 
Pakistan and Afghanistan. The research team consid-
ers including the perceptions and attitudes of these 
Conflict-sensitive employment  
as an analytical concept
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varied groups as crucial for developing an appropriate 
concept of conflict and conflict-sensitivity, as it mate-
rializes from the different local perspectives. 
In Iran, the team held a focus group discussion 
with seven Afghan chief executive officers (CEOs) of 
international transport companies in Mashhad. Some 
had only little business in Afghanistan, but four of 
them had branches in Herat, Kandahar and Kabul. 
The discussion provided a general picture of how 
companies are dealing with insecurity and corrup-
tion and of which solutions they would prefer. Two 
Iranian forwarder company managers interviewed  
in Tehran, and the transport section of the Afghan 
Consulate in Mashhad explained the border proce-
dures when crossing from Iran into Afghanistan. One 
Iranian international transport company manager 
described how his company did business with Afghan 
power holders. Moreover, two haulage company own-
ers in Herat, Afghanistan, were asked about their 
experiences and views on cross-border trade between 
Iran and Afghanistan.
The research team complemented data from 
these varied sources with reviews of academic litera-
ture, publicly accessible documents and reports as 
well as information from the media. They analyzed 
data through thematic coding, supported by software 
for qualitative data analysis (WEFD QDA) to capture 
the definitions of interview partners and particular 
aspects and understandings of the conflict environ-
ment that could be helpful to develop the concept of 
conflict-sensitive employment with a focus on the 
transport sector.
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More than one decade of international intervention 
in Afghanistan had induced a national growth rate  
of nine per cent on average between 2003 and 2012 
(World Bank, 2015). Among others, the transport sec-
tor was thriving in a context where up to 10 per cent 
of the working population benefited from aid-funded 
job opportunities (Lister & Karaev, 2004). Between 
2003 and 2009, the level of imports and exports 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan increased by 
almost 250 per cent, with an annual average growth 
rate of approximately 30 per cent (ADB, 2010). How-
ever, many skilled employees came from abroad. The 
head offices of companies operating in Afghanistan 
often were located in the neighbouring countries  
(e. g. Pakistan, Iran, India, Dubai, Turkmenistan), with 
finance flows crossing the borders between these 
countries, making a lasting effect on Afghan compa-
nies and Afghan employees questionable from the 
outset.
The economic boom period has not prevented a 
constant rise in insecurity since 2006, mainly caused 
by the reinvigorated Taliban movement (Abbas, 2014). 
The increase in violent conflict has displaced Afghans 
from their settlements. In 2016, an estimated 1.2 mil-
lion internally displaced persons (IDPs) were trying 
to make a living in different parts of the country 
(UNHCR, 2016), about two million Afghans were stay-
ing in Pakistan and roughly another two million in 
Iran. Some studies indicate that displaced people 
lacking protection and jobs are susceptible to joining 
local security forces and/or non-state armed groups 
(Solomon & Stark, 2010, p. 261). Whereas economic 
incentives rarely have been the sole reason for this 
(Bhatia & Sedra, 2008), the high number of people 
displaced within Afghanistan and in the neigh-
bouring countries nevertheless poses a particular 
challenge for job creation (Mielke & Grawert, 2016). 
Whereas own-account workers, day labourers and 
unpaid family workers—people in ‘vulnerable 
employment’ according to the categories of the 
 International Labour Organization (ILO)—constitute 
81 per cent of the workforce in Afghanistan (CSO, 
GIRoA, 2011, p. xviii), the percentage of Afghans in 
such precarious conditions in Iran and Pakistan is 
unknown. 
‘Vulnerable employment’ also pertains to 
employment in transportation, which includes 
mainly short-term jobs for unskilled labour, whereas 
migrants, mostly from Pakistan, used to occupy 
skilled jobs during the boom period of the Afghan 
economy (Parto et al., 2007). The decades of war and 
the tense security situation in Afghanistan have had 
severe impacts on the development of the country, 
with great challenges for companies active in the 
region. For businesses, finding technically qualified 
local workers in Afghanistan has been difficult as 
there has not been sufficient infrastructure in place 
for training and education. Many skilled persons have 
left Afghanistan as labour migrants. Others have 
engaged in the war. 
The reduction in donor funding after 2012, trig-
gered by the announcement of the military draw-
down by the US administration, had a direct negative 
impact on the transportation sector causing the col-
lapse of Afghan logistics companies and layoffs, or at 
least reductions in the wages of workers and employ-
ees. Not only did the majority of the NATO forces 
depart, but so did their entourage of international 
contractors and suppliers. As a consequence, many 
local and regional suppliers and contracting compa-
nies have gone out of business or had to reduce their 
magnitude of operations to a sustainable level. More-
over, hundreds of mostly small businesses are facing 
possible extinction due to insecurity and weak 
Afghan state institutions (Malmstrom & Cusack, 
2010). Efforts of the Ministry of Transport and Civil 
Aviation (MoTCA) could not counterbalance these 
adverse effects. The MoTCA is in charge of regulating 
the private sector transport industry, coordinating 
agreements between the private sector and interna-
tional hauliers and establishing offices in neighbour-
ing countries to facilitate international trade (ADB, 
2010). These activities, however, do not include efforts 
to implement conflict-sensitive transport business 
and employment strategies.
Table 1 shows that Afghanistan’s dependence on 
imported commodities has increased tremendously 
within the decade of the significant presence of inter-
national troops and agencies and has slightly declined 
due to stagnating imports since 2014. Imports exceed 
Context of the transport sector in Afghanistan
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exports by a multiple of more than thirteen. Between 
2010 and 2015, the export of Afghan transport services 
declined from US $208.250 million to US $35.529 mil-
lion (calculated from data of UNCTADstat, 2015) indi-
cating that Afghan haulage companies significantly 
reduced shipments abroad. The high import excess 
suggests that foreign haulage companies have contin-
ued to do business in Afghanistan. According to the 
World Bank’s ‘Ease of Doing Business’ indicator, 
cross-border trade is the only one out of six indicators 
that had improved in Afghanistan between 2010 and 
2016 (World Bank, 2016a). Nevertheless, the high gap 
between imports and exports reflects a low level of 
demand, low productivity and multiple supply con-
straints the Afghan economy faces.
According to a report published by the ILO in 
2012, economic growth in Afghanistan had largely 
been driven by the service sector (namely transporta-
tion and communication), accounting for 24.6 per 
cent of the (formal) employment in the country (ILO, 
2012). The ILO report had predicted that the services 
sector would continue to account for about half of 
Afghanistan’s economic growth in 2011/2012, mainly 
“fuelled by the growth in the telecommunications 
sector. In addition, donor funding and development 
projects will continue to drive the demand for trans-
portation and distribution services” (ILO, 2012, p. 18). 
It also predicted that the services sector would 
suffer most from the progressive reduction of inter-
national aid, as international finance flows had sig-
nificantly and artificially led to its growth in the first 
place. More specifically, the transport sector, which 
had benefitted tremendously from the presence of 
the international military troops, was expected to 
shrink, as the demand for fuel, equipment and food 
transportation by road would decrease drastically: 
The transport sector will be badly hit by the 
ongoing transition. As for the other services 
subsectors, the future is still uncertain, even if 
their heavy  reliance on imports is likely to 
negatively impact their activity and lead to 
mass layoff and worsening employment situa-
tion, with more underemployment and lower 
wages (ILO, 2012, p. 18).
This prediction has come true. Whereas the ser-
vices sector had been growing at a rate of 15.1 per cent 
between 2008 and 2012, the growth rate slumped to 
2.8 per cent in 2015 (World Bank, 2016). As the with-
drawal of international troops from Afghanistan has 
been ongoing since 2014, the transport companies 
have lost business and had to scale down, laying off 
staff members. Reinvigorating the transport sector 
and related employment requires new investments. 
Currently, plans for investment are prepared that aim 
to cover the whole region by building long distance, 
cross-country traverses (e. g. pipelines, roads, rail-
ways, dams) entering from the regional neighbours 
into Afghanistan. If these plans materialize, they may 
revive the cross-border trade between Afghanistan 
and the neighbouring countries. This will be the pre-
condition for a rise in employment in the sector.
Cross-border road transport is the means by 
which trade is conducted. The development of trade 
volumes between Afghanistan and its main regional 
partners, Pakistan and Iran, is the concrete economic 
context in which the transport sector operates. Trade 
agreements and bilateral investment treaties shape 
the formal transactions and clearings arrangements 
 value (in millions of US dollars)
year 2005 2010 2014 2015
merchandise exports 384 388 571 571
merchandise imports 2,471 5,154 7,729 7,723
merchandise trade balance -2,087 -4,766 -7,159 -7,151
Table 1
Development of cross-border trade 2005 to 2015
Source: UNCTADstat, 2015.
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faced by cross-border transport companies in their 
daily business. Besides official trade that follows for-
mal procedures, irregular trade is a large field of eco-
nomic activity by small-scale hauliers. Details of these 
context factors of transportation are provided below.
Afghanistan’s trade and trade 
 agreements with Pakistan and Iran
Afghanistan’s economy shows a serious deficit in its 
balance of trade. Total reported exports were equiva-
lent to only seven per cent of Afghanistan’s total 
imports, with exports amounting to US $571 million 
in the financial year 2015/16 (World Bank, 2017). 
Despite growing political tensions between the two 
countries, Pakistan had remained Afghanistan’s larg-
est trading partner until 2015 (Husain & Elahi, 2015), 
with formal trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan 
amounting to US $1,573 million, a substantial increase 
from US $830 million in the financial year of 2006/07. 
Yet, Afghanistan and Pakistan always have been une-
qual trade partners. In 2012, for example, 32 per cent of 
Afghanistan‘s total exports went to Pakistan, while 
only eight per cent of Pakistan‘s total exports were 
shipped to Afghanistan. Of Afghanistan‘s imports, 23.5 
per cent came from Pakistan, while less than one per 
cent of Pakistan’s imports originated from Afghani-
stan (Economist, 24 April 2014). 
In 2016, Iran overtook Pakistan with a trade value 
of US $1.808 billion. The official trade volume with 
Pakistan had dropped by US $1.2 billion to US $1.346 
billion (Jahanmal, 2017; World Bank, 2017). Iran thus 
supplied the largest share of total Afghan imports 
(23.4 per cent) (WTO, 2015a) 2 and Pakistan the second- 
largest share (17.43 per cent), whereas Pakistan 
remained the main destiny for Afghan exports 
amounting to US $227 million, with exports to Iran 
2 \  In 2008, Iran ranked number five of Afghanistan’s merchandise export 
destinations and number three for imports, receiving three per cent of 
Afghanistan’s merchandise exports and providing six per cent of its 
imports. In 2013, and still in 2015, Iran was on position three in exports, 
receiving eight per cent of Afghanistan’s exports in 2013 and 5.1 per 
cent in 2015. In the same year, Iran was still at position two among the 
importers to Afghanistan, providing eight per cent of Afghanistan’s 
imports, following Pakistan, which supplied 17.4 per cent of Afghani-
stan’s imports (WTO, 2015).
only reaching US $29 million in 2016 (World Bank, 
2017). However, if both official and unofficial trade  
are considered, Pakistan is likely to have remained 
Afghanistan’s largest trade partner, whereas, Afghani-
stan stayed the third-largest trading partner with 
Pakistan, with a trading volume of an estimated US $5 
billion (Customs Today, 2016). These figures indicate 
that the trade link between the two countries is com-
plex, partly due to the high level of informality. 
Pakistan
Afghanistan’s landlocked status implies that it relies 
on its neighbours to facilitate the transit of its trade 
to the broader global economy. This reliance is par-
ticularly strong in Pakistan’s case because of tribal 
and ethnic connections and a long trading history. 
The first attempt to regulate and codify the scattered 
provisions was in 1965 when Pakistan and Afghani-
stan signed a bilateral transit treaty. Under the aus-
pices of this treaty, transit trade between Pakistan 
and Afghanistan was regulated officially. The treaty 
recognized the right of Afghanistan to access the 
seaports of Pakistan, but did not address Pakistan’s 
access to Central Asia through the territory of 
Afghanistan. Despite the bilateral Afghanistan Tran-
sit Trade Agreement (ATTA, 1965), Pakistani stake-
holders believed that the extension of the transit 
facility to Afghanistan was used for unauthorized 
trade, causing damage to the domestic industry and 
loss of revenue to the government of Pakistan (GoP) 
(USAID Trade Project, 2014). Also, Pakistan was inter-
ested in enhanced market access to the Central Asian 
Republics (CARs) through Afghanistan after the CARs 
had achieved independence in 1991. These two factors 
were instrumental in compelling the GoP to negoti-
ate a new transit treaty with Afghanistan.
Afghanistan was keen to upgrade the existing 
treaty due to the growing need for trade and transit 
through the seaports of Pakistan, which provide 
Afghanistan with the shortest and most cost-effec-
tive route to global trade. Additionally, Afghanistan 
desired greater access to the growing Indian market. 
The 1965 treaty provided Afghanistan only with 
access to the ports of Pakistan and did not contain 
provisions stipulating rights to trade with India 
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through Pakistan’s land routes. Subsequently, 
through a special dispensation in the Import and 
Export Control Act, the GoP allowed exports of fresh 
fruits, vegetables and herbs from Afghanistan to 
India through the Wagah land border station. Despite 
repeated requests from India and Afghanistan, Paki-
stan continued to disallow the transit of Indian 
exports to Afghanistan via its land routes. The 
Afghanistan–Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement 
(APTTA, 2010) was the first step taken to facilitate the 
movement of goods through Pakistan and Afghani-
stan (USAID Trade Project, 2014). 
Negotiations between Pakistan and Afghanistan 
on the new transit treaty commenced in 2008 after a 
visiting delegation from Afghanistan tabled a draft 
text for Pakistan’s consideration. It took both sides 
more than two years to conclude the negotiations, 
and the new transit treaty became operational on 
12 June 2011. The agreement also led to the formation 
of a joint chamber of commerce in 2012. However, the 
joint chamber has weak capacities. It mostly caters to 
day-to-day matters faced by businesses and has not 
managed to address policy related issues (discussion 
with a representative of the joint chamber of com-
merce, Kabul, 2015). 
In July 2012, Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed to 
extend the APTTA to Tajikistan, a first step towards 
the establishment of a north–south trade corridor. 
The proposed agreement was to allow Tajikistan to 
use Pakistan’s Gwadar and Karachi ports for its 
imports and exports, while Pakistan was to enjoy 
trade with Tajikistan under terms similar to the tran-
sit arrangement with Afghanistan. Despite these 
agreements, the full potential of Afghanistan’s and 
Pakistan’s bilateral trade has not been reached, with 
trade between the two countries dropping in recent 
months (Husain & Elahi, 2015). 
There are several reasons for volatilities in the 
formal trade between the two countries. One key factor 
has been deteriorating diplomatic relations between 
them.3 The two governments accuse each other of 
3 \  It is beyond the scope of this paper to elaborate on the history of 
 Afghan–Pakistani relations, which explains the current problems. For 
a systematic placement of these relations within regional frameworks, 
see Harpviken & Tadjbaksh, 2016.
keeping hotbeds of violent groups in the border area, 
which commit suicide bomb attacks and atrocities 
with high civilian death tolls. A journalist has summa-
rized the Afghan-Pakistani impasse as follows: 
From the Afghan perspective, Pakistan has not 
done enough to deal with militant groups that 
find sanctuary within its borders–and at the 
extreme has  actively supported groups staging 
attacks in Afghanistan. From the Pakistani 
perspective, Islamabad is doing as much as it 
can–perhaps fearing that an all-out ousting of 
such groups would merely preface their shift 
in focus to Pakistan. It’s a conundrum that will 
continue to cause rifts between the two coun-
tries and ultimately prevent meaningful pro-
gress in the peace process (Putz, 2016).
Bureaucratic obstacles the business community 
are facing from both governments are a second and 
related factor for the decline in trade. Border control 
measures have become stricter. Customs duties and 
tax levies on imports put on by the government of 
Afghanistan caused profit margins of Pakistani 
export–import traders and hauliers to shrink signifi-
cantly. According to a manager of a haulage company 
in Pakistan, it used to 
load four to five trucks a day and send them to 
Afghanistan. Now we can only do one or two a 
day. Recently, the customs duty in Afghanistan 
has been raised significantly (300,000 per truck 
Pakistan rupees (PKR), about US $2,860), which 
is an obstacle since it increases the cost of 
goods transported (...). The border control has 
become much stricter, with more rigorous con-
trols on documentations on both sides. While 
these regulations have been in place before, 
they are now implemented better (interview 
with the operations manager of a logistics 
company in Peshawar, 2015).
On the Pakistani side, adhering to tax regulations 
is considered key to ensuring that the business will 
stay afloat. As an operations manager of a cargo com-
pany put it, “as long as you pay tax, the government 
doesn’t bother you” (interview in Peshawar, 2015).
A third factor is the impact the reduction of 
international troops had in Afghanistan, which 
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caused a decline in the regional transport business. 
NATO forces and international NGOs had catered to a 
non-commercial market which provided profitable 
business opportunities for companies and boosted 
the economy with capital. But as troops were leaving, 
many companies had to downsize their business, 
which resulted in job losses.
“Generally the Afghan economy has suffered, 
which has meant less purchasing power for consum-
ers and … [problems for] Afghan businessmen import-
ing goods from or through Pakistan” (owner of a 
haulage company, Peshawar, September 2015). 
Subsequently, the attention of businessmen 
returned to commercial goods for the local market, 
but as the purchasing power of locals is poor, many 
companies closed down or supplied other regional 
markets outside Afghanistan. 
The political tensions between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, the decline in international demand and 
the border procedures introduced by the new treaty 
contributed to diverting transit trade to Iran and 
India; both countries had developed the infrastructure 
in and around the Iranian ports of Chabahar and Ban-
dar-e Abbas in a joint effort. The number of containers 
entering Pakistan from Afghanistan was 75,288 in 
2009/10 and fell significantly after the implementation 
of the new transit treaty in 2011. In 2013/14, probably in 
response to the slump in demand by international 
agencies and troops in Afghanistan, the number of 
commercial containers crossing the border dropped to 
36,274, less than half of the previous figure. In 2014/15, 
the flow of commercial containers rose by 36 per cent 
to 49,507 (Khan, 2016)—still far from previous levels.
To sum up, Pakistan and Afghanistan have 
remained important trading partners since the 1960s, 
and the continuous interaction comprises informal 
and formal trade (see also Schetter, 2002). Since 2006, 
both countries have managed to keep the combined 
exports and imports value above US $1.5 billion. How-
ever, because of the deterioration of the diplomatic 
relations between Afghanistan and its biggest trading 
partner, Pakistan and red tapism on both sides of the 
border, trade with Pakistan has declined, and the 
trade between Afghanistan and Iran and India has 
risen. Although a number of trade agreements have 
been signed over the years to facilitate trade and tran-
sit links, the full potential of these agreements 
remains unrealized. 
Iran
The most important commodity Afghanistan imports 
from Iran has been refined petroleum (OEC, 2014). 
Besides fuel, liquid gas, and oil, wood, cement, con-
struction materials and plastic, Afghanistan imports 
mainly consumer goods such as detergents, food, 
construction material, and medicines from Iran. 
Afghanistan‘s main export products to Iran are fresh 
and dried fruits, herb, and saffron (IRNA, 5 March 
2016). Cars and car parts are brought from China, 
India, and Europe through Iran to Afghanistan, 
mostly through Bandar-e Abbas port (interviews with 
officers at the transport department of the Afghan 
Consulate in Mashhad and the owner of a forwarder 
company in Tehran in 2015).
The main official border crossings between Iran 
and Afghanistan are Dugharun near Islam Qala in 
the north and Milak–Zaranj/ Nimruz in the south-
east of the Iranian Sistan Baluchestan province. The 
latter is used for transports from the port of Chabahar 
through Zabol to the Herat-Kandahar highway in 
Afghanistan. Goods destined for Afghanistan enjoy 
preferential tariffs when shipped through the Ira-
nian port of Chabahar. 
At Dugharun, mainly trucks carrying goods from 
Bandar-e Abbas port at the Persian Gulf in Iran cross 
the border to Afghanistan and continue to Herat. 
Dugharun has a special economic zone for customs- 
free trade, where forwarder companies organize 
trans-shipment according to the international trade 
and customs regulations (incoterms) 4. Some freight 
forwarder companies hold a share in the special 
 economic zone, where employees work for the clear-
ance of goods transported from Iran to Afghanistan 
(interview with the owner of a forwarder company in 
 Tehran, 2015). The primary destination for shipments 
4 \  International commercial terms (incoterms) are, for example, ‘free on 
board’ (fob), which means that the fee is paid by the importer at the 
port of discharge and by the exporter at the origin. Incoterm standards 
distinguish between ‘cost and freight’ (cfr) and ‘cost, insurance, and 
freight’ (cif). Documentation fees are added to the costs.
AfghAnistAn’s cross-border trAde with PAkistAn And irAn \ E. GrawErt, r. Nusrat, Z. a. shah
14 \ bicc \ Working paper  4 \ 2017
from Iran to Afghanistan is Herat, the main transport 
hub in the west of the country, where 22 per cent of 
the value of the total national imports of fuel, food, 
machinery, construction materials and vehicles 
arrive and are re-loaded on domestic trucks. Herat 
reflects the national trends in export and import 
fluctuations. Whereas imports from Iran rose from 
US $108 million in 2003/04 to US $582 million in 
2011/12 and US $1,808 million in 2015, exports 
remained low, amounting to US $20 million in 2011/12 
and US $29 million in 2015 (CSO Herat, 2014; World 
Bank, 2015a). 
Until around 2010, about 400—at peak times even 
up to 640— trucks crossed the Iranian-Afghan border 
at Dugharun per day. Since that time, the number has 
decreased every year. In 2015, on average 80 trucks 
moved to Afghanistan through Dugharun per day, 
with some exceptions when up to 200 or 300 trucks 
crossed the border. The main reasons were a general 
decline in the transport business, financial problems 
of the Afghan merchants, and since the establish-
ment of the new government of Afghanistan in 2014, 
low employment, low payment, and low business. 
Officers at the transport department of the Afghan 
Consulate in Mashhad admitted that the real number 
of trucks crossing the border was higher than the 
official figure, because some drivers moved unoffi-
cially without passing the transport department of 
the Afghan Consulate, which issues the route pass 
documents (‘truck visa’) (interview, 2015). This indi-
cates that on the Afghan-Iranian border, irregular 
trade is common and requires further examination, 
which is provided below. 
Until 2012, business in Afghanistan for Iranian 
companies had been thriving. NATO and interna-
tional organizations sent food, beverages and other 
commodities to Afghanistan through Iran, creating 
business opportunities for Iranian hauliers that 
obtained trade licenses from the Ministry of Com-
merce and Industry. Since 2013/14, a combination of 
several factors has caused the decline of the Iranian- 
Afghan cross-border trade. The withdrawal of inter-
national troops and agencies from Afghanistan has 
led to a shrinking demand by international clients, 
contributing to a reduction of Iranian exports and 
trade. Furthermore, the decline in the oil price since 
2014 has had the effect that Iranian haulage compa-
nies reduced or stopped supplies to Afghanistan. For 
example, an Iranian company that used to have 60 
trucks moving, of which 20 were tankers carrying 23 
metric tons each, stopped the fuel supply in 2015 due 
to the low price of petrol. Commodities from other 
countries were moved through the ports of the Cas-
pian Sea. Sugar and wheat were carried from Dubai 
through Bandar-e Abbas and then on transit through 
Iran to Afghanistan (interview with a manager of an 
international haulage company in Mashhad, 2016). 
Political problems and violence in Iraq were further 
events affecting fuel trade, because a major trade 
route for fuel was closed so that Iranian transporters 
had to shift to routes through Turkmenistan to sup-
ply Afghanistan. Hence, the decline in numbers of 
trucks crossing the Iranian-Afghan border has vari-
ous economic reasons as well as reasons stemming 
from repercussions of armed conflicts in the region. 
Transport companies have responded to these prob-
lems by reducing supplies and by changing routes. 
Iran and Afghanistan had concluded a bilateral 
investment treaty in 2006, which came into force in 
2008 (UNCTAD, 2017). However, both countries still 
place obstacles in the way of cross-border trade, as 
the ‘trade across border’ rankings of the World Bank 
indicate. Whereas Afghanistan ranks 175 (World 
Bank, 2017), Iran is ranked at 170 (World Bank, 2017a). 
In 2015, Iran and Afghanistan signed a trade deal 
worth US $50 million within the framework of the 
bilateral treaty, by which Afghanistan could import 
one million metric tons of diesel per annum from 
Iran and increase liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) 
imports up to a volume of 200,000 tons. Iranian 
sources claim that this was five times as much as in 
2014 (IRNA, 5 March 2016). The gradual lifting of eco-
nomic sanctions on Iran5 in 2016 sparked intensified 
negotiations between the governments of Iran and 
5 \  Economic sanctions had been imposed on Iran by Western govern-
ments to force the Iranian government to curb its nuclear programme. 
When Iran agreed to reduce its uranium enrichment activities under 
the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Authority (BBC 
News, 16 January 2016, some sanctions were lifted, but not those related 
to banking and finance, which has hindered the resumption of foreign 
investment and trade (Zarroli, 2016). 
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consider the irregular trade as a source of insecurity; 
but at the same time, state and government officials 
as well as parts of the military participate in it and 
contribute to its persistence. 
In official statements, Afghanistan’s neighbours 
consider “illegal economies” (Hooper & Leguen, 2014, 
p. 6) as drivers of conflict as they provide funds to 
armed groups and undermine the legitimacy of the 
government and its effectiveness, in particular with 
regard to collecting and redistributing revenues from 
taxes and customs. In a roundtable discussion with 
representatives from the region around Afghanistan, 
convened by the Barcelona Center for International 
Affairs (CIDOB) in Doha, Qatar, a participant stated 
that “(l)ack of justice and rule of law, of which infor-
mal economies are a part, are a greater threat to 
Afghanistan than insurgency” (Hooper & Leguen, 
2014, p. 6). From this perspective, corrupt state author-
ities also cause insecurity. This hints at some involve-
ment of government and state officials in irregular 
trade.
The roundtable talk also highlighted that inter-
national agencies had paid non-state armed groups 
for convoy protection. In this sense, international 
agencies contributed to “war-lords´ protection rack-
ets … (R)ent sought by the Taliban from extortion on 
licit and illicit agencies inadvertently create[d] a 
direct financial pipeline from Washington DC to the 
Taliban” (Hooper & Leguen, 2014, p. 6). 
Aid agencies and, most likely, the international 
troops of ISAF thus had added to insecurity in the 
Afghan border areas when facilitating their 
cross-border logistics during the economic boom 
period of 2002 to 2012 (see Grawert & Shirzad, forth-
coming 2017).
The various dimensions of irregular trade of Paki-
stan and Iran are described below.
Pakistan
Pakistan is an active player in the shadow economy 
at the border, with a large number of state and non-
state actors benefitting from irregular trade with all 
kinds of commodities (Schetter, 2002). Legal goods are 
shipped undocumented across the border to avoid 
customs duties and taxation at the two official border 
Afghanistan. In March 2016, the Afghan Minister of 
Trade and Industries announced customs exemp-
tions for Iranian businessmen, who would invest in 
Afghanistan and move their production lines to his 
country (Mehr News Agency, 9 August 2016). A further 
agreement consolidated Iran’s cooperation with 
Afghanistan in mineral exploration, extraction and 
exports and stated that Iran would provide the coun-
try with the required mining equipment and 
machinery for the mining of iron ore in north-west-
ern Afghanistan near the Iranian border. According to 
the Iranian Minister of Industries, Mining and Trade, 
Iran was “prepared to share its experiences in setting 
up industrial parks and creating jobs, while removing 
difficulties in transportation, customs procedures 
and bank operations” (Financial Tribune, 5 March 2016). 
Soon after, in May 2016, India, Iran and Afghanistan 
signed a tripartite agreement aiming to make the 
Iranian port of Chabahar a transit hub bypassing 
Pakistan. The intended joint investments strive to 
connect India to Afghanistan and Central Asia, 
whereas Afghanistan will get access to the Indian 
Ocean and reduce its dependency on Pakistan (Al- 
Jazeera, 24 May 2016). In August 2016, an agreement 
between the Iranian and Afghan customs offices 
followed, intended to alleviate transit between the 
free trade zone at Chabahar port and Afghanistan’s 
border crossing at Mahirud (Mehr News Agency, 
9 August 2016).
In sum, trade relations between Iran and Afghan-
istan have intensified since 2008. There is the real 
option that Iran will engage in investment in 
Afghanistan and thus set off the transport sector. 
Whether this will benefit Afghan transport compa-
nies and employment remains an open question.
Dimensions of irregular trade
Not only are Pakistan and Iran the dominant official 
trade partners with Afghanistan, but a very signifi-
cant share of trade across both borders is irregular. 
Irregular trade includes the shipping of legal com-
modities informally and without documents across 
the border, but also the smuggling of drugs and weap-
ons as well as human trafficking. Both governments 
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posts at Torkhum and Ghulam Khan as well as at 
unofficial crossings across the porous border. State 
and non-state actors have an interest in keeping the 
irregular trade strong because of higher profits, red-
tape in formal trade (which especially deters busi-
nessmen, many of whom are illiterate), and as a 
long-established means to control the tribes on both 
sides of the border (Siddiqa et al., 2014). 
Yet, the government of Pakistan has made 
attempts to prohibit irregular trade. Already in Sep-
tember 2005, it announced plans to build a 1,500-mile 
(2,400 km) fence along its border with Afghanistan to 
prevent insurgents and drug smugglers from slipping 
between the two countries. The plans to fence and 
mine the border were again considered in 2007 and 
then in 2009, but they were not fully implemented. 
Work on the construction of the gate and related 
facilities began in 2014, but Afghan reservations over 
border regulation kept causing delays (Akbar, 2016). 
The imposition of customs duties in Afghanistan on 
trucks from Pakistan and stricter border controls that 
are enforced in a way not done previously have 
increasingly restrained Pakistani transport compa-
nies from cross-border trade since 2015. 
At that time, the Pakistani business community 
attributed the decline in bilateral trade mainly to pro-
cedural hurdles created by the state bureaucracies, 
linked to the political rift between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. The entrepreneurs considered the 18 per cent 
duty imposed on imports from Pakistan by the Afghan 
customs offices as discriminatory in comparison to 
the duty imposed on imports from Iran and India. 
Non-tariff barriers, lack of physical infrastructure, 
security threats, extortions demanded by local mili-
tants in turbulent areas and corrupt practices at the 
borders by the levies and frontier constabulary were 
further obstacles to trade (Siddiqa et al., 2014). Numer-
ous regulatory constraints regarding foreign currency 
rules, bank synchronization and on issued letters of 
credit, etc. further restrict the room for manoeuvre for 
Pakistani companies active in Afghanistan. To allevi-
ate the procedures, the Pakistani government intends 
to open an Ex-Im Bank (a government export-import 
bank to underwrite trade) to facilitate credits should 
no other bank be willing to engage (Kundi, 2016).6
The relationship between Pakistan and Afghani-
stan deteriorated over the course of 2016. The con-
struction of a gate at Torkham border in June 2016 
resulted in skirmishes between the two countries, 
and the border was forced to close. The political 
administration in Khyber Agency imposed a curfew 
in Torkham and Landikotal and closed the Paki-
stani-Afghan highway. Hundreds of vehicles were 
stranded at different points on the Khyber Pass, espe-
cially at Takhta Beg, Parangsum and Begyari check 
posts (Khan et al., 2016). After an attack on a Sufi 
shrine in Pakistan’s Sindh province, allegedly by 
so-called Islamic State, in February 2017 (BBC News, 
17 February 2017), Pakistan again closed the Torkham 
and Speen Bodak crossings, claiming that the attack 
had been planned inside Afghanistan. This resulted 
in the fact that at least 1,200 trucks carrying food-
stuffs of Afghan traders were stuck on both sides of 
the border (Al-Jazeera, 2017). The crossing only opened 
again in March 2017. 
On the other side of the border, Afghan business-
men complained of procedural hurdles established by 
the Pakistani state bureaucracy. Officials of the Trans-
porting Vehicles’ Owners Association reported that 
the Pakistani embassy would not grant road passes 
for vehicles whose road pass validation date had 
expired and neither renew vehicle permits nor pro-
vide new ones (ACCI, 2015). Afghan merchants also 
accused Pakistani customs officials of regularly 
extracting bribes from them to give them clearance. 
Afghan proposals to allow the transit of imports from 
India through Pakistan faced resistance, in part 
owing to Pakistani concerns that the products might 
be dumped in Pakistan and affect the local industry. 
These changes have increased the cost of transporta-
tion for Afghan companies significantly (Siddiqa et 
al., 2014). 
6 \  Operating as a government corporation, an Ex-Im Bank finances and 
insures goods for customers unable or unwilling to accept credit risk. 
The Ex-Im Bank does not compete with private sector lenders, but 
rather provides financing for transactions that would otherwise not 
occur because commercial lenders are either unable or unwilling to 
accept the political or commercial risks inherent in the deal.
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The waiting time for trucks crossing the Pakistani- 
Afghan border became very long due to border clo-
sures and “this caused great disruption and losses  
as food went rotten” (interview with officers at the 
transport department of the Afghan Consulate  
in Mashhad, 2015). This ordeal contributed to an 
increase in the use of irregular channels of trade and 
improved the position of Iran in trade competition. 
“Iran has a better relationship with Afghanistan, and 
through Iran, goods from other countries can be 
transported to Afghanistan” (Officer at the transport 
department of the Afghan Consulate in Mashhad, 
2015). These ‘other countries’ mainly refer to the Gulf 
states but also include India and China.
Apparently, the government of Pakistan has made 
rather half-hearted attempts over more than a decade 
to tighten controls on irregular trade along its border. 
The half-heartedness can be explained by differences 
of interest between various state components in 
maintaining the porous border. The functioning of 
the irregular trade in this environment is presented 
below with a focus on employment and self-employ-
ment in the local transport sector. 
Iran
At the Iranian-Afghan border, no particular tensions, 
closures, or fencing hinder cross-border trade. Never-
theless, the government of Iran also considers the 
border area as troublesome. An academic study 
describes the dimensions of border insecurity as fol-
lows: “The dimensions of threat and insecurity along 
the Iranian eastern borders are: drugs, terrorism, the 
Afghan immigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees, … 
[expansion] of insecurity into Iran and religious 
actions” (Savarrakhsh & Ezzati, 2016, p. 119). 
In fact, while the official volume of Afghan 
exports to Iran is very low, there is a high but undocu-
mented amount of narcotics that cross the border and 
are shipped through Iran to Europe or Russia along 
the Balkan route or to the Persian Gulf. Revenues from 
opium have financed armed groups, mainly Taliban, 
in Afghanistan. From the perspective of the Iranian 
state, security threats from “non-state actors and ter-
ror networks and the Taliban … have gained strength 
because they have created a criminal market economy 
supported by a viable illicit network fuelled by a bur-
geoning narcotic trade” (Neill, 2009, p. 2). 
According to an Iranian newspaper report, the 
Iranian narcotics control headquarters seized about 
1,748 metric tons of opium and arrested 922,000 per-
sons in connection with drug smuggling along the 
Afghan border from 2013 to 2015. Some of these were 
“drug lords” (Tehran Times, 24 August 2016). The man-
ager of an Iranian forwarder company confirmed that 
some drivers were smuggling opium across the bor-
der. If they are caught, they will be fined and forced to 
pay an amount depending on the type of opium. The 
Iranian customs officers will confiscate the truck. If 
the smugglers are caught with heroin or cocaine, the 
drivers will be executed in Iran, no matter whether 
they are Afghans or Iranians. This has happened sev-
eral times in the special economic zone in Dugharun 
(interview in Tehran, 2015). Many Iranian security 
agents have been killed in clashes with drug traffick-
ers. Eradicating this trade provides a strong non-eco-
nomic incentive for Iran to intensify cooperation 
with Afghanistan (Lohschelder & Zeidan, 2016).
Further reasons for the Iranian state to put 
efforts in securing its border are its desire to prohibit 
the smuggling of weapons and human trafficking as 
well as cross-border infiltration by militants, because 
this “not only affects inter-governmental relations 
but also the safe and legal transit of energy, goods and 
people” (Neill, 2009, p. 2). Not only the Taliban, but 
since 2015, also so-called Islamic State have threat-
ened Iran at its border with Afghanistan. According 
to a commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps, Afghanistan “has no rule” over the border 
 (Karami, 2016).
Yet, like Pakistan, the Iranian government, too, 
contributes to irregular trade, but for different reasons. 
In Iran, the economic sanctions imposed by the 
United States and other Western states have led to an 
even greater willingness of companies to avoid formal 
trade. Avoidance of border formalities is not only 
driven by the prospect of lucrative profits but the 
necessity of sanctions busting. The government is 
involved because Iranian haulage companies often are 
part of the “quasi-governmental” or “pseudo- 
private” sector (Harris, 2016, p. 100), with private and 
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public shareholders each owning 50 per cent. The 
shareholders on the part of the state often are the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or ‘Sepah-e 
Pasdaran’, a special military organization that is linked 
to the Iranian government but separated from the 
army. The economic endeavours of the IRGC increased 
significantly under the rule of President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad (2005-2013). They increased, in particular, 
following the renewed economic sanctions that 
resulted from the US-Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 and had 
the effect that important sources of foreign capital 
dried up in Iran (Harris, 2016, pp. 97-102). Large qua-
si-governmental holdings comprise businesses 
extending from oil, chemicals, hotels, shops, and office 
rental buildings to the transportation of goods, includ-
ing cross-border shipments for NATO and interna-
tional agencies. According to an Afghan officer, 
sometimes the USA stopped these supplies.  
Afghanistan got oil supplies from Russia and 
made contracts with other states to ship oil 
and petrol through the Bulgaria—Azerbaijan—
Turkmenistan route to  Afghanistan. This was a 
loss for Iran and caused  political problems be-
tween Iran and Afghanistan  (interview with 
officers at the transport department of the  
Afghan Consulate in Mashhad, 2015). 
In fact, the US sanctions against the Iranian 
energy and petroleum industry have never been lifted 
since 2006, but they were circumvented as long as 
profits were lucrative. Not only the US Army and 
international agencies as customers, but also the 
Iranian government, whose military branch operated 
as a supplier, applied double standards with regard to 
the sanctions. There are cases where the Iranian gov-
ernment arrested Iranian haulage company manag-
ers who supplied the Americans in Afghanistan, 
accused them of anti-Islamic behaviour and took 
them to court (interview with a manager of an inter-
national haulage company in Mashhad, 2016). From 
the perspective of Afghan haulage companies operat-
ing across the Iranian border, the sanctions have led 
to severe problems of money transfer (focus group 
discussion with Afghan CEOs of haulage companies 
and importers in Mashhad, 2015).
Trade with Iran often takes peculiar forms. 
Much of the business with Iranian companies is in 
the hands of Afghan government officials and is 
conducted by certain families and power holders, 
such as governors or other influential leaders, who 
directly negotiate with Iranian company managers. 
These power holders issue special contracts for par-
ticular Iranian companies, specifying the goods to 
be transported. The contracts function as a license to 
cross the border. Within Afghanistan, Afghan mer-
chants, who are often relatives of government offi-
cials and power holders, distribute the fuel to supply 
engines, petrol stations and well pumps, and deliver 
cooking gas or fuel to households (interview with a 
manager of an international haulage company in 
Mashhad, 2016). The owner of an Iranian forwarder 
company put the relevance of personal relationships 
in the cross-border business in slightly different 
terms, stating that for trade with Afghans, a “rela-
tionship of trust” was crucial, because “the shadow 
of the government is on every company” (Tehran, 
2015). This statement indicates that the transport 
business appears to thrive on particular networks 
and connections to power holders within and out-
side the government that control the fuel market in 
Afghanistan. 
There is a deep mistrust of Afghan company own-
ers in Afghanistan towards Iranian hauliers as well as 
Afghan hauliers that operate cross-border from Iran. 
One owner of such a company in Herat warned, 
“Afghan businesses in Iran are loyal to the govern-
ment of Iran”. He expressed his fears stating, 
The Iranians have a transit company. Its staff 
is paid to work for the Iranian government. A 
company representative goes to the govern-
ment of Iran and gets visas for 100 people. 
These people do what the Iranian government 
wants. (…) The Iranians are smart, and in par-
ticular, the Iran-based transit haulage compa-
nies are smart. The Iranian government con-
trols their drivers for its own purposes (…). 
NATO transports are checked, for the Iranian 
government wants to know what is inside—it 
is espionage. The Iranian government pays Af-
ghans to do this, especially those working for 
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haulage companies (interview with an owner 
of a haulage company in Herat, 2015). 
These concerns stem from the ‘quasi-governmen-
tal’ structure of major Iranian haulage companies 
that pursue various interests of the Iranian govern-
ment in Afghanistan, including intelligence interests 
targeting NATO forces stationed in Afghanistan. A 
further indication of mistrust is related to narcotics 
transports. 
“People in the Iranian government want narcot-
ics to be brought to Iran. Others are linked to the 
government to report these people so that they are 
fined” (interview with an owner of a haulage com-
pany in Herat, 2015). 
This accusation highlights the danger of decep-
tion and misinformation aimed at extracting penal-
ties from hauliers when transporting goods across 
the border. 
On the Afghan side of the border, the business 
environment affecting the transport sector is shaped 
by remnants of the war economy. Pointing to the 
“dark side of cross-border trade” (Leslie, 2015, p. 16), 
Leslie holds that illicit exports of narcotics from 
Afghanistan to Iran yielded the funds for purchases 
of many imported goods. In 2005, these funds were 
estimated to account for 30 per cent of transfers at 
the informal cash market in Herat. Gains from other 
businesses also flow into this market, as, for example, 
those of the above-mentioned fuel mafia, consisting 
of company managers, officials from Afghan authori-
ties and local politicians, who made sure that low 
standard fuel imports bypassed official tests in 2013 
(Leslie, 2015, p. 16; Tanha & Kohistani, 2013). Parallel 
power structures in Afghanistan thus absorb large 
parts of the (black) market and create volatile condi-
tions for cross-border haulage companies.
The insights into the irregular business activities 
in Herat reveal the close connection of economic 
relations with political interests prevailing in the 
Afghan-Iranian border region. Even the international 
sanctions on Iran and the prospect of lifting them 
have had an impact on the economy in Herat. In 2011, 
Iran stopped annual shipments of one million metric 
tons of Iranian fuel, partly due to the suspicion that 
these supplies went to the US military. Fuel prices in 
Herat increased by 60 per cent immediately (Leslie, 
2015, p. 14). Iranian investment policy in Afghanistan 
is also driven by political interests, such as that of 
reducing the number of Afghan refugees and 
migrants living in Iran, improving the control of the 
narcotics trade, and striving for the closure of US 
Army bases in the Iranian neighbourhood in the west 
of Afghanistan. The means by which Iran pursues the 
‘stabilization’ of Afghanistan to these ends affect the 
economy as well as politics in Afghanistan. According 
to local inhabitants in western Afghanistan, the 
‘invisible arm of Iran’ reaches into Afghanistan. One 
example of this is the deliberate creation of insecu-
rity at the construction site of an Indian-funded dam 
(Salma dam), because the dam would affect the down-
stream flow of water into Iran. Other examples are 
incidences when Iran funded favoured council and 
parliamentary candidates (Leslie, 2015, p. 15). A mix-
ture of economic and security interests has led Iran 
to invest about US $370 million in infrastructure in 
Afghanistan, in particular roads and rail as well as 
power transmission lines (Leslie, 2015, p. 14). Yet, as 
these structures were largely implemented by Iranian 
companies with Iranian workers, these investments 
contributed to one of the major bottlenecks for sus-
tainable growth of the domestic Afghan economy 
and, in particular, of employment opportunities 
(Mashal, 2014, p. 48).
To sum up, the dimensions of irregular trade 
comprise smuggling as well as the circumvention of 
sanctions through an Iranian-Afghan fuel network 
with the involvement of parts of the government. 
Insecurity affecting cross-border trade ranges from 
threats of terrorist attacks by non-state armed groups 
over the smuggling of narcotics and human traffick-
ing to having to pay protection money to NSAGs and 
bribes to state organizations. Frequent closures of 
borders and harassment by border officers create 
uncertainties that drive companies into irregular 
trade. The findings from field research below show 
how these conditions affect employment and how 
workers deal with this environment. 
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Against this backdrop, the purpose of this research 
was to understand better the employment strategies 
adopted by haulage and logistic companies based in 
Pakistan and Iran. The key informant interviews and 
focus group discussion highlight the challenges busi-
nessmen face with regard to cross-border procedures, 
their perceptions of the impact of insecurity on busi-
ness, and their employment strategies.
Pakistan
Very small family owned businesses to international 
logistics and transport corporations are engaged in 
cross-border trade between Afghanistan and Paki-
stan. Two particular business models can be distin-
guished. One model is that of registered Afghan and 
Pakistani haulage companies, and the other and pre-
vailing one is business by unregistered and mostly 
small companies and individuals.
The larger, registered companies have direct con-
tacts with importers and exporters; sometimes they 
are also involved in the procurement and distribution 
of the goods. These companies mostly have offices in 
either country or work with partners across the bor-
der and usually are involved in single commodity 
transports or shipments of limited types of high-vol-
ume goods like cement, steel, coal or flour. They usu-
ally neither supply Afghan local food markets nor 
provide consumer goods. The companies often own a 
few trucks, while further trucks are leased or hired 
according to the required volume. Paid clearance 
agents handle the paperwork at the border and then 
the drivers receive the documents required for the 
shipments. Most drivers hired by these bigger compa-
nies are Pakistanis. 
For shipments to Afghanistan over land, only 
bonded (custom licensed) carriers are allowed to 
transport cargo. These licensed sub-contractors get 
vehicles and manage them on their own so that the 
company’s engagement with this aspect of the busi-
ness is minimized. In Pakistan, being a bonded or 
licensed company requires registration of all trucks a 
company uses on the routes with the National Logis-
tics Corporation (NLC). Upon entering Afghanistan, 
the company has to have the trucks registered with 
the customs authority and get a trading license from 
the Afghan Investment Support Agency, a depart-
ment at the Ministry of Commerce and Industries. 
Since 2014, the government of Afghanistan has 
placed a restriction on certain professions such as in 
information technologies (IT), accounting, adminis-
tration and security services to encourage interna-
tional companies to hire locals. However, as interview 
partners expressed, the locals that seem qualified do 
not always fulfil the skills or level of expertise 
required by most professional companies. As a result, 
companies are often forced to hire foreign workers, 
mainly from Pakistan and Dubai, which makes 
recruitment more expensive and challenging. A man-
ager of a haulage company stated, “skilled capacity is 
generally very low in the local Afghan labour market. 
(…) Attracting expats like Pakistanis or others to 
come to these areas is very difficult, so companies 
have to pay higher wages to bring them to a war zone 
and also offer lots of perks and facilities” (interview 
at Lahore, 2015). 
For Pakistani haulage companies or any hauliers 
based in Pakistan, there are two categories of recruit-
ment, 1) office staff and 2) drivers and labourers for 
loading and unloading. Usually, only a small number 
of office staff positions is needed (depending on the 
size of the company), which comprise positions such 
as accountants, IT and secretaries. Most companies, 
base their recruitment for these positions on merit, 
experience, previous performance and good refer-
ences. However, given that a number of medium- 
sized companies are family-owned, personal relation-
ships and recommendations from friends and family 
members also play a role in these recruitments. More-
over, companies with offices both in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan often employ Pakistanis in Pakistan and 
Afghans across the border.
With regard to drivers and trucks, most large 
companies work via contractors in the Pakistani- 
Afghan region. These contractors differ and have var-
ying capacities. Some contractors give one-window 
service and other vendors fulfil specific jobs such as 
shipping, transportation and clearance, depending on 
the size of the company and the kind of services 
required. The transport industry also makes use of 
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informal networks for the supply of both trucks and 
drivers. The sector functions like a big community, 
with the adda forming the hub of a professional net-
work for the transport companies. 
There are two types of addas, one, a simple 
shop that connects truck owners who come to 
them with a route preference and ask to be put 
in touch with companies who want drivers. 
The second is the warehouse, so we don’t just 
have an office but with the warehouse, we can 
offer storage facilities (owner of a haulage 
company, Peshawar, 2015).
The labourers engaged in loading and unloading 
of goods usually work for a daily wage and are pri-
marily employed by sub-contractors (tehkedars). 
Whereas some tehkedars are permanently sub-con-
tracted, others remain in a fluid position. For 
instance, an individual from the group of day labour-
ers gathering at the adda might take on the role of 
tehkedar and negotiate jobs on behalf of the group. 
Hence the labourers are not necessarily tied to one 
tehkedar but are essentially freelancers, as are the 
tehkedars, and can act as a representative in negotia-
tions and dealings with employers. The tehkedar pro-
vide informal mechanisms of recruitment for the 
companies. 
“In terms of sub-contractors like transporters or 
heavy equipment firms, word spreads quickly 
through informal channels about which company 
has a lot of cargo, and these sub-contractors come 
seeking work” (owner of a transport company, Pesha-
war, 2015).
The role of the state in the transportation sector 
is ambiguous. Some company owners stated that they 
did not get any support from the government of Paki-
stan; others went further: “the state doesn’t give, it 
takes” (interview with a manager of a logistics com-
pany in Karachi, 2015). Several company owners 
reported about corrupt traffic police in Pakistan and, 
after crossing the border, about the requirement to 
bribe the Afghan border police, customs officers, traf-
fic police and city police in order to get permission to 
pass. If the driver does not pay, the officers will 
demand the vehicle be unloaded in order to check it, 
but payment of a bribe leads to passage without delay 
and thus save much time. A frequent complaint by 
transport companies was that their trucks often had 
to stay put for two or three days without any reason, 
waiting for passage (interviews with transport com-
panies in Kabul, 2015). Corruption and nepotism obvi-
ously are prevalent in the industry. According to the 
operations manager of a cargo company, “You have to 
bribe people everywhere in Pakistan and Afghani-
stan. It’s then a matter to be handled between the 
customs, the police and the driver” (interview in 
Peshawar, 2015). 
Another concern voiced by large transport com-
pany owners importing goods from neighbouring 
countries was the restriction on free trade by govern-
ments. An example given was the gas trade with 
Pakistan. Afghanistan imposed trade barriers, argu-
ing that the gas price in Afghanistan would rise if 
these barriers were removed. From the perspective of 
large importers, this argument was not convincing 
(interview with large transport company owner in 
Herat, 2016).
Within Afghanistan, transport companies are 
required to re-load the freight from Pakistani trucks 
onto Afghan trucks. Some company owners reported 
that municipalities located near the border, such as 
Samar Khil between the Pakistani border and Jalala-
bad, demanded an extra payment for this trans-ship-
ment to Afghan lorries, amounting to AFNs 10,000 
(about US $148) per load. As a consequence, compa-
nies were forced to increase the prices of the 
imported goods in order to recover the losses incurred 
during transportation (interviews with transport 
company owners importing goods from Pakistan, 
Jalalabad, 2015). Moreover, in Afghanistan, different 
customs offices in different places have to be visited 
for various procedures. A transport company owner 
suggested, “the government should bring the stamp-
ing office (had ser) to the custom house. Currently the 
had ser is located in Talashai Chowk and the customs 
house is here at the Ring Road, which is very far” 
(interview in Jalalabad, 2015).
From the perspective of transport company own-
ers, the border problems have to be solved at the level 
of national governments, in particular, between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
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Insecurity on the road is a further problem. 
Because some routes are more dangerous for people 
of a certain ethnicity, tribe or religious denomination, 
drivers negotiate with each other and other sub-con-
tractor teams so that a driver can take on a route he 
feels to be most secure. In that sense, “certain routes 
would automatically require some ethnic preference 
for security” (manager of a transport company, 
Lahore, 2015). Hence, some Pakistani transport com-
pany managers consider certain types of jobs or 
routes to be more suitable for people from a certain 
region and/or ethnicity. One transport company from 
the sample interviewed used only Afghan drivers 
within Afghanistan, Pashtun drivers as far as Pesha-
war, and mainly Punjabi drivers from Peshawar into 
Pakistan. A representative from that company also 
revealed that the majority of the drivers in the trans-
port industry were from the Khyber area. Another 
major group is from Mianwali and from the Chakwal 
area. These are the areas from which middlemen and 
tehkadar often recruit drivers. However, most repre-
sentatives of companies claimed that there was no 
ethnic preference for recruitment.
Language is also a reason for choosing one eth-
nicity over another to work in certain areas. While 
most languages and cultures work well in Kabul, the 
situation is more complicated in far-flung areas 
where language and ethnicity, and sometimes 
nationality, can become barriers. For example, in 
Pashtun areas, Pashto speaking Pakistanis are pre-
ferred, while in northern Afghanistan Indians are 
preferred because local people generally do not like 
Pakistanis.
There is a further perception that Afghans are 
very strong and hard-working and therefore consid-
ered good people for heavier work such as loading 
and unloading of trucks. On the other hand, some 
Pakistani companies said they find people from 
Afghanistan difficult to work with as they are not 
good at learning new skills and tasks. They are there-
fore not always considered for technically difficult 
operations, while some prefer Punjabi drivers, charac-
terizing them as: “relatively educated and, tempera-
ment wise, more narum (soft-natured), while Pathans 
[Pashtuns] are khar dimagh (short-tempered), hard in 
temperament and mostly illiterate. So the Punjabis 
are easier to deal with” (owner of a transport com-
pany, Peshawar, 2015).
In general, a lot of job-hopping is characteristic 
for the transport sector, in particular among (tempo-
rary) labour. During Ramadan and Eid, the main reli-
gious holidays, availability of labourers is low as most 
people go back to their villages. At the same time, 
“demand for goods in Afghanistan is usually higher 
in Ramadan and there is more work as businesses 
stock up to prepare for Eid shopping” (Operations 
manager of a cargo company, Peshawar, 2015). This 
often induces companies to hire independent truck 
drivers in order to meet the demand. Companies also 
have to pay higher wages. 
Apart from the cultural and religious holidays, 
the climate in Afghanistan, with its pattern of very 
cold and snowy winters and hot summers, also puts 
constraints on labour recruitment. In summer, it is 
more difficult to find workers to do the hard work due 
to the heat, and many labourers try to find other 
kinds of work during this period. In the harvesting 
seasons and during Eid, workers and sub-contractors 
with some of the larger companies might get better 
paid or allowed to take time off. During winter, work 
slows down and most petty contractors go back to 
their villages. This creates issues for transport compa-
nies in terms of acquiring and retaining their work-
force during these periods. 
Permanent staff include those employees that 
have been retained by a company for some time (not 
strictly in terms of employment contracts), such as 
office staff and truck drivers. They are considered 
permanent staff because of their longstanding associ-
ation with the companies, and this is rewarded by 
good salaries or increased compensation. A few com-
panies invest a bit more in their employees by provid-
ing training for office staff. Given the predominantly 
‘informal’ nature of this industry, good personal rela-
tions are pivotal for successful business. As one owner 
of a transport company explained: 
Managing labour and drivers and retaining 
them is difficult because they fight over small 
issues. So to retain them we make peace be-
tween them—through lots of conflict resolu-
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tion. There can be very small things over which 
fights happen, such as on the division of daily 
wages amongst them. We try to talk to them 
and calm them down by talking to them nicely. 
If that doesn’t work, we can also deal with 
them harshly (interview in Peshawar, 2015). 
The engagement of transport companies in 
maintaining good personal relationships extends to 
family support in emergencies, as in the following 
example: 
Since most recruitment is done through tehke-
dars, we don’t take any responsibility here, and 
it is the  responsibility of the tehkedar to deal 
with it. How ever, sometimes we do help them 
out. Last year one of our labourers died in a fire 
at his house and we helped his family out 
though we didn’t have to. That’s how it works 
(owner of a transport company, Peshawar, 
2015).
To a large degree the transport sector is run 
through informal rules and practices. It is based on 
personal networks and relationships and unwritten 
rules. 
Here is no paper work—we have age old rules 
of transport that we all know. Though these 
rules are not written down, they are generally 
understood by everyone working in the indus-
try since these are the informal rules of busi-
ness that we abide by. Although there are no 
formal or legal contracts, this system works 
well without any interference by the govern-
ment (owner of a transport company, Pesha-
war, 2015).
Informal relationships can also pose risks, as the 
case of one transport company reveals. The company 
had gained the support of the government forces for 
the security and protection of their trucks as the 
owner’s brother was the governor of a major region 
and owned all the trucks in that area. This meant a 
big cost saving for the company. Until the governor 
was assassinated, the company enjoyed the perks of 
having close relations with powerful actors with 
vested interests in the industry and could avoid com-
pliance with formal procedures (interview with a 
transport company owner in Lahore, 2015).
To sum up, large transport companies use a range 
of employment practices, from formal internal proce-
dures to recruitment through informal brokers (adda, 
tehkedar), who supply not only drivers and workers, 
but also vehicles and labourers for loading and 
unloading. This gives companies the flexibility to 
respond to volatile demand as is typical for the trans-
port business. Hiring different drivers on the basis of 
language skills and ethnic, tribal or religious back-
grounds for route suitability also enables a flexible 
response to changing conditions. The informal rela-
tionships can still provide some security for those 
workers whom company owners want to retain for 
their loyalty and good performance. Companies may 
also offer them informal support in emergencies. This 
indicates that labour relations in Pakistani transport 
companies have acquired the characteristics of 
patronage networks. Such networks can create pow-
erful mechanisms for circumventing formal proce-
dures and undermine efforts to formalize cross-bor-
der trade. As long as transport companies do not 
experience any clear benefits from adopting these 
procedures and payment requirements, the current 
mixture of formalized and irregular trade is likely to 
remain in place. 
Iran
Cross-border trade between Iran and Afghanistan is 
conducted by Iranian companies or Iranian-Afghan 
joint ventures. In 2015, 171 Afghan-Iranian joint ven-
tures with 51 per cent Iranian and 49 per cent Afghan 
shareholders were registered in Iran as transport 
companies carrying goods to Afghanistan. Some com-
panies had their main office in Afghanistan, mainly 
in Herat, and had one or more offices in Iran, mostly 
in Mashhad, and sometimes also in Dubai and other 
regional centres. Although the government of Iran did 
not use to permit companies run by Afghans to regis-
ter without an Iranian partner, informal Afghan busi-
nesses have always existed. In 2016, rules changed and 
it has become possible to have a company run by an 
Afghan in Iran but only if the company employs 
100 per cent Iranians. Due to the persistent sanctions 
on banks, the company has to bring in foreign 
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currency at the official exchange rate, which means a 
high loss for the company (interview with the owner 
of a transport company in Mashhad, 2016). 
Iranian companies usually send an employee to 
collect the route pass from the transport department 
of the Afghan consulate in Mashhad in eastern Iran, 
for which they have to pay about US $13 import tax, 
which goes to the Afghan government. The transport 
department deals with all administrative issues 
related to cross-border transport (interview with 
officers at, 2015). The manager of an Iranian transport 
company made the critical remark that standards 
were low in Afghanistan. For example, goods were 
not, he said, properly weighed and the Iranian 
authorities had once gone there to correct the scales 
(interview with a manager of an Iranian transport 
company in Mashhad, 2016). This illustrates a wide-
spread attitude among Iranians, who consider 
Afghans as low-skilled and technically 
unprofessional. 
Either the freight forwarder companies or the 
truck drivers themselves do the paperwork at the 
border. Forwarder companies are shipping agents 
operating as common carriers and cooperating with 
the chambers of commerce and industries. They 
organize shipments for individuals or for corpora-
tions needing to get goods moved from a manufac-
turer or producer to a market, customer or final point 
of distribution. To this end, the forwarder companies 
deal with the customs, the documentation require-
ments and all other activities required for interna-
tional shipments. Some Iranian forwarder companies 
organize and conduct the whole of international 
movement of goods by using professional logistics 
consultants who plan the transports, furnish the 
means of transport (trucks, trains, aeroplanes, ships), 
and manage all the border procedures. A few of them 
also take care of difficult orders that require circum-
venting regions with violent conflict (Ukraine, Iraq, 
Afghanistan) or Western sanctions on Iran. Some 
forwarder companies were founded by former cus-
toms officers, who have maintained good relation-
ships with the customs authority to the benefit of 
these businesses. A typical business is involved in 
trading petroleum products, steel or wheat, which are 
brought in from Russia, Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan 
to Iraq or the ports of Mumbai and the Persian Gulf 
through the ‘Russia-Mumbai corridor’. When ship-
ping to Afghanistan, many forwarder companies 
operate at the Islam Qala / Dugharun border crossing. 
The trans-shipment centres are either in the Dugha-
run special economic zone or in Herat, where freight 
from Iranian trucks is loaded onto trucks of Afghan 
companies with Afghan employees. These companies 
then supply all areas in Afghanistan. Only fuel, liquid 
gas and oil are shipped mostly by Iranian companies 
throughout Afghanistan, because they have proper 
tankers. They need a special license for such ship-
ments (interviews with two owners of Iranian for-
warder companies in Tehran, 2015). 
Herat, the second largest city of Afghanistan, is 
the western transport hub, where high numbers of 
trucks arrive from Iran and Turkmenistan. A lot of 
Afghan transport companies and also Iranian-Afghan 
joint ventures have offices in Herat. Trucks entering 
Herat from Iran usually stay there for two or three 
days in order to complete unloading and customs 
procedures. After unloading, most trucks of 
Afghan-Iranian transport companies return empty to 
Iran and cross through Dugharun / Islam Qala back 
to Bandar-e Abbas port (interviews with officers at 
the transport department of the Afghan Consulate in 
Mashhad and the owner of a forwarder company in 
Tehran, 2015). 
The Iranian government does not allow Afghans to 
transport goods from Afghanistan through Iran, 
although a few exceptions are made for agricultural 
products such as grass, melon seeds, oil seeds and 
potatoes and, more rarely, for precious stones. Domes-
tic haulage is only permitted for Iranians. There are no 
bilateral contracts giving rights for Afghans to ship 
merchandise through Iran. Afghan drivers need a visa 
and a license to travel through Iran and, as soon as 
they cross the border, come under the authority of the 
Iranian government. They are permitted to stay in the 
country for only four days (interviews with officers at 
the transport department of the Afghan Consulate in 
Mashhad and the owner of a forwarder company in 
Tehran, 2015). These rules  conform to Iranian law, 
which prohibits employment of foreigners if Iranian 
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workers are available.  According to Article 120 of the 
Iranian labour law of 1990: 
Foreign nationals are not allowed to work in 
Iran unless they are provided with an entry 
visa with the right to engage in specific work, 
and secondly, they receive work permit accord-
ing to relevant laws and by-laws. … The general 
policy of the country is aimed at meeting its 
labour requirements and implementing its in-
dustrial and development projects through 
Iranian manpower as much as possible. How-
ever, employment of foreign manpower when 
there is an immediate need for their expertise 
is not ruled out (ICCIMA, 2015). 
This explains why Afghan-Iranian joint ventures 
tend to have contracts with Iranian transport compa-
nies and employ Iranian drivers to drive the trucks to 
the Iranian port of Bandar-e Abbas, load them and 
return to Herat. The Afghan consulate’s transport 
department is responsible for upholding Afghan driv-
ers’ rights against Iranian companies (interview with 
officers in Mashhad, 2015). It is common for large 
companies to combine international and domestic 
operations, making contracts with Afghan companies 
to carry the goods to destinations within Afghani-
stan. Only a few Iranian transport companies 
involved in cross-border trade exclusively employ 
Iranian drivers, mostly those with the license to ship 
goods (mainly fuel) to various destinations in 
Afghanistan. Iranian transport companies without 
such a license unload their freight in the special eco-
nomic zone of Dugharun or in Herat, and Afghan 
drivers continue the journey (Focus group discussion 
with Afghan CEOs of transport companies and 
importers in Mashhad, 2015). 
The number of employees of the cross-border 
transport companies interviewed varied between 20 
and 400, with up to half being Afghans working at the 
company sites in Afghanistan. Some companies com-
bine employed office staff with sub-contractors. In 
addition to its office staff and drivers, a transport 
company usually needs six or seven casual labourers 
to re-load the freight, typically food and construction 
material that Afghan-Iranian companies bring to 
Afghanistan. These labourers are usually Afghans. 
Even within Iran, casual labourers working in ware-
houses and sometimes in loading and unloading are 
also mainly Afghans, who rarely have a work permit. 
One of the problems of employing an Afghan from 
the perspective of CEOs is that people in Afghanistan 
have no birth certificates, and indeed many do not 
even have identity cards. Hence, companies cannot be 
sure whom they are employing (Focus group discus-
sion with Afghan CEOs of transport companies and 
importers in Mashhad, 2015). Government officials in 
Afghanistan stressed the boost to employment from a 
thriving cross-border trade, with the population in 
Herat benefitting from job opportunities and vio-
lence on the decline (interview at the transport 
department of the Afghan Consulate in Mashhad, 
2015). 
Typically, a large transport company will own 
around 200 trucks and hire further trucks according 
to demand, so that the actual number of trucks in use 
can more than double. Some company managers 
reported that they lease some of their own trucks to 
drivers in Iran, allowing the Iranians to use the truck 
for their own business outside their working hours 
for the company and, after some years, be in a posi-
tion to own the truck. This has the advantage that the 
drivers will take responsibility for keeping the trucks 
well maintained. Transport companies often employ 
a limited number of staff drivers and bring in further 
drivers who own a truck as sub-contractors for a spe-
cific route. The same applies to transport companies 
that own taxis; they can expand their capacity by 
adding up to three times as many car-owning taxi 
drivers on limited contracts (Focus group discussion 
with Afghan CEOs of transport companies and 
importers in Mashhad, 2015).
The mix of sub-contractors, temporary and per-
manent employees is a response to volatilities in 
demand and serves the interests of employers, who 
do not have to pay wages when there are no orders. As 
employees in Afghanistan do not enjoy any social 
insurance, what is important for them is the chance 
to be retained at the workplace, even if at declining 
wage rates in times of low demand. The sub-contrac-
tors, by contrast, may not find any client and hence 
find no income opportunity.
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On the other hand, some large companies provide 
permanent employment in their own maintenance 
department, in one case for up to 30 mechanics on 
their premises in Afghanistan. These employees are 
Afghans who are usually kept in the company after a 
probation period of two months. One company sent 
some of its staff mechanics to Iran for special train-
ings. Most companies do not, however, employ their 
own mechanics but have the trucks repaired and 
maintained by an outside company, because they  
lack the facilities and finance to run a maintenance 
unit within the company. Several Iranian-Afghan 
cross-border transporters use workshops for general 
maintenance that are located in Khorasan province 
in north-eastern Iran. They have no contractual rela-
tionship with the mechanics and do not employ a 
mechanic, except perhaps one mobile mechanic in 
Afghanistan whom the company can call out when a 
vehicle breaks down. A typical statement by the 
transport company CEOs was, “for maintenance, we 
go to special mechanics whom we know and who do 
their job well” (Focus group discussion with Afghan 
CEOs of transport companies and importers in Mash-
had, 2015). This indicates that, like in Pakistan, there 
is a network of relevant trades around transport com-
panies based on loose professional relationships and 
trust.
Transport companies operating in cross-border 
trade between Iran and Afghanistan are not merely 
profit-oriented, but also driven by a range of non-eco-
nomic motivations. There are company owners with 
Afghan origin based in Iran are driven by the will to 
help the conflict-torn society; sometimes a charitable 
attitude induces businessmen to keep on transport-
ing goods from Iran to Afghanistan despite the inse-
curity. Some Iranians with Afghan ancestors engage 
in cross-border trade because they know both sides of 
the border and feel empathy for the Afghans staying 
in Iran under difficult conditions. For similar reasons, 
some Iranian companies regularly supply Afghan 
partners.
To sum up, the cross-border transport business  
is mainly guided by informal rules and practices. 
Most recruitment is done through informal networks 
as personal trust is critical. Except for office work, 
most jobs are informal, often performed through 
subcontractors, and seasonal. Employment on the 
basis of national or ethnic identity plays a role in the 
cross-border transport business for a variety of 
 reasons, among them restrictive laws prohibiting 
employment of foreigners, security considerations 
and perceptions about the traits and qualities of 
 different ethnic groups. 
Perceptions of insecurity by regionally 
operating transport company owners
Business partners of the transport companies 
surveyed include international NGOs, local Afghan 
businessmen, international partners, NATO and ISAF. 
The foreign forces have generated a lot of work and 
brought in capital, but they are obviously associated 
with heightened security risks. Companies con-
tracted by these forces are targets for attacks by the 
Taliban and sometimes other armed groups which 
reject the presence of foreign troops. Facing a difficult 
conflict environment and major security risks, inter-
national partners are hesitant even to introduce their 
brand name in Afghanistan. This has provided oppor-
tunities for Afghan companies to serve the require-
ments of the foreign companies, but under the same 
risky conditions.
In fact, insecurity does not only affect the compa-
nies on the Afghan side of the border. Karachi is an 
epi-centre of political violence stemming from politi-
cized ethnicity in the context of a rapid increase of 
the city’s population and the selective use of different 
migrant groups and their organizations by the mili-
tary of Pakistan to pursue particular political and 
security agendas. One such conflict is between the 
Muttahida Quaumi Movement, a liberal political 
party, and the Pakistani army, which has attempted 
to divide the movement in order to counter its rising 
political power (Jamal, 2016). Frequent violent clashes 
and shifting alliances of the Pakistani military with 
militant groups in Karachi have had an impact on 
the security of cargo and vehicles. Unrest in the city 
has repeatedly led to road blockages in which vehi-
cles get stuck. This has created shortages in the mar-
ket and driven up prices. Delays in delivery have also 
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resulted in higher costs for vehicle rental, which 
adversely affect transport companies.
From the perspective of the owner of a transport 
company in Peshawar: “Most security problems are 
faced by companies working with NATO, while com-
mercial cargo doesn’t face any security problems 
unless there is a political strike by the Muttahida 
Quaumi Movement in Pakistan or [a violent inci-
dence] in other places on the route” (interview, 2015). 
This view expresses in one sentence the insecu-
rity perceptions found on both sides of the border. 
From the perspective of transport routes and destina-
tions, the company faces greater risks in connection 
with certain clients, such as NATO (identifiable by its 
base locations) than in the case of private traders and 
customers. Such insecurity faced by transport compa-
nies stems from the Taliban and other NSAGs fight-
ing against Western forces and the government of 
Afghanistan on the Afghan side of the border, and 
from political violence on the Pakistani side, which 
can disrupt shipments. The statement of a manager 
of another company puts the route-guided perception 
of insecurity by hauliers in a nutshell: “For the trans-
port sector, the roads are everything. Any road block-
age or security problem along the route creates great 
problems and leads to loss of income and delays” 
(interview with the operations manager of a logistic 
company in Peshawar, 2015).
With regard to Pakistan, three factors have a 
direct impact on the cross-border transport business: 
the political tensions between Pakistan and Afghani-
stan, the companies’ connections with international 
clients, mainly the NATO and international forces, 
and political unrest in Pakistan. As the political ten-
sions between the two countries have increased, 
stricter border controls are being put in place, which 
cause delays and losses. Any connection with interna-
tional clients makes the vehicles of transport compa-
nies a target for attacks, mainly by the Taliban. 
As for the Iranian side, Afghan merchants have 
reduced the number of trucks going into Afghanistan 
because they are uncertain about making invest-
ments under conditions where truck drivers have 
faced significantly greater insecurity since 2014. Driv-
ers have been at risk of being robbed or even killed on 
route. Moreover, the Silk Road Project, which includes 
building tarmac roads and railways through the 
whole region7, has not yet been finalized. Whereas 
Iran has constructed the road up to the Afghan bor-
der, the section between the Iranian border and Herat 
has not been completed by Afghan companies as 
planned. These are the two main reasons why many 
Iranian cross-border transport companies have 
stopped working (interview with the owner of an 
Iranian forwarder company in Tehran, 2015).
Afghan CEOs of transport companies in Mashhad 
referred to the Afghan branch of the Islamic State of 
Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and the Taliban as forces 
driving insecurity, saying these two armed groups 
were hiring people to work for them and supplying 
them with money and weapons. They believed that 
this happened because there was not enough invest-
ment and hence, a lack of civilian employment 
opportunities in Afghanistan (Focus group discussion 
with Afghan CEOs of transport companies and 
importers in Mashhad, 2015). According to the owner 
of a transport company in Herat, there are check-
points at the Islam Ghaleh border run by NSAGs, who 
demand commission payments and, further on the 
route, various tribal groups force truck drivers pass-
ing their region to pay. The interview partner men-
tioned seven different power holders in control of 
various parts of Herat province (interview with the 
owner of a large transport company in Herat, 2015).
Agreeing that the main cause for insecurity were 
NSAGs, Afghan transport company owners in Iran 
accused the government of Afghanistan of playing a 
very ambiguous role. One of the CEOs aired the view 
that “the government is not executing security. They 
[government officials] are trying to re-educate the 
7 \  The ‘Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Maritime Silk Road’ is an 
initiative by the Chinese government to boost trade with Asia, Africa 
and Europe through enhanced infrastructure development. Due to in-
security, most of the planned roads, railways and airports bypass Af-
ghanistan and Pakistan whereas Iran is considered a crucial connect-
ing link between Asia and Europe. On the other hand, China’s interest 
in mineral resources from Afghanistan has led to the opening of a rail-
way from Hairatan to Mazar-e Sharif in the north. The Asian Infra-
structure Investment Bank (AIIB), with US $100 billion in capital, and 
the New Silk Road Fund, with US $40 billion for the project, intend to 
fund a number of infrastructure projects across the region (PressTV 
Iran, 31 October 2016).
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Taliban. They would do better to kill them. Currently, 
they are living freely in Kunduz and Ghazni” (focus 
group discussion with Afghan CEOs of transport 
companies and importers in Mashhad, 2015).
This implies an expectation that the government 
should regain full control of Afghanistan and clear 
the country from insurgents by force, not by attempt-
ing integration, as the following statement shows: 
“If the government protects the drivers and the roads, 
the trucks can get going. There is no other solution. 
For example, the drivers can form convoys for better 
protection—but it’s not happening now. There should 
be more security posts to make the roads safer” (focus 
group discussion with Afghan CEOs of transport 
companies and importers in Mashhad, 2015). 
The CEOs see the responsibility for security as a 
matter for the government, which should fulfil its 
role of providing protection and safety. This implies 
that secure roads and transport routes are the main 
means of encouraging companies to expand their 
business, which in turn will create more employ-
ment. The industry’s implicit point of reference is the 
period of booming business during the 2000s when 
Iranian-Afghan transport companies were running 
extensive cross-border operations. 
One CEO referred to the link between peace, as 
the task of government, and the role of business peo-
ple and investors, stating: “If the companies were 
united, they could work better and employ more peo-
ple. … We need investors from other countries to help. 
Afghanistan is open to all countries. … Ashraf Ghani 
brought peace and unification and hope for investors. 
But this has not materialized” (focus group discus-
sion with Afghan CEOs of transport companies and 
importers in Mashhad, 2015). 
The disappointment over the new government is 
obvious in these statements. Peace and unity are con-
sidered as the basis for an attractive environment for 
international investors. The CEO also points to a lack 
of unity among transport companies, which affects 
employment negatively. There are hints of the exist-
ence of ‘mafia companies’, which undermine the 
prospects of doing profitable business. One of the 
companies, for example, had bought gasoline for US 
$380-400 per ton in Turkmenistan and for US $300 in 
Iran, but was forced to pay customs duties and taxes 
amounting to US $230 per ton of gasoline to the 
Afghan government. This left no margin for profit, 
but the main criticism of the CEO was that: “There 
are mafia people who pay only US $80 to the govern-
ment and take the fuel to the military. Then they sell 
it on the black market” (focus group discussion with 
Afghan CEOs of transport companies and importers 
in Mashhad, 2015). 
This highlights a perception of outright injustice 
on the part of government actors linked to certain 
companies in a mafia-like relationship. The state-
ment reveals a great deal of anger over companies 
with political links that have made a fortune, spoilt 
the prices for others and undermined true 
competition.
A further problem mentioned was the ever- 
changing customs and taxes in Afghanistan. The 
CEOs were convinced that the money collected by 
customs and tax officers did not enter Afghan govern-
ment coffers but private pockets. According to them, 
there had been little impact of the Customs and 
Trade Facilitation Project initiated by the World Bank 
(World Bank, 2010). They claimed: “The taxes are 
lower on food and higher on other goods. Last year [in 
2014], the customs rate at the border to Afghanistan 
was 4 per cent, this year it is 10 per cent for basic 
needs products and 30 per cent for other goods, such 
as computers and construction materials” (focus 
group discussion with Afghan CEOs of transport 
companies and importers in Mashhad, 2015). 
High customs duties and unfair competition at 
the Afghan border have induced some transport 
 companies to rely more on the route through Turk-
menistan to Afghanistan, despite gasoline and petrol 
being cheaper in Iran (US $200) than in Turkmeni-
stan (US $300) (interview with the Afghan owner of a 
transport company in Mashhad, 2015). This mirrors a 
high degree of uncertainty with regard to a compa-
ny’s cost calculations for the cross-border transport 
of goods from Iran to Afghanistan. 
From the perspective of Afghan CEOs operating 
international transport companies in Iran, insecurity 
in Afghanistan has led to shifts in the markets they 
supply. One of them stated: “We do not have any 
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 special problem in Iran; we are operating legally and 
pay taxes like the Iranians. However, because of the 
insecurity in Afghanistan, our trade with Afghani-
stan is only 20 per cent and with the Middle East 
80 per cent.” Along the same lines, another CEO 
explained, 
Previously we sent about ten trucks to Afghan-
istan per month, now only one, because of the 
security problem there. Ten to fifteen people 
are guarding the trucks from the border up to 
Herat. The company has to pay them well; oth-
erwise they will join the Taliban. Well-known 
people need guards. From Herat to Kabul, there 
are no good roads and there is insecurity 
[through NSAGs], too (focus group discussion 
with Afghan CEOs of transport companies and 
importers in Mashhad, 2015). 
In response to the rising insecurity in Afghani-
stan, Afghan company managers in Iran have thus 
reduced their transport operations and hire security 
guards to protect their trucks or cars. Bad roads 
requiring slow driving exacerbate the insecurity of 
transports through Afghanistan, because slow trucks 
can be attacked more easily. Moreover, in the last 
statement the CEO perceives competition between 
the Taliban and transport companies for armed men 
who may work as guards or as fighters, according to 
the payment offered. 
Another approach of dealing with insecurity was 
pointed out by another CEO, who said: 
Our trucks do not move with guards. The driv-
ers have no problem. They pay money to the 
Taliban. They are flexible and know how to 
contact them. They tell them that they are 
bringing goods for the people. … The company 
has to give the drivers money for the Taliban to 
pay for passage. However, sometimes they en-
counter robbers who just claim to be Taliban 
(focus group discussion with Afghan CEOs of 
transport companies and importers in Mash-
had, 2015).
 Contacting the Taliban and convincing them 
that a shipment serves the interest of the population, 
and agreements on moderate payments for passing 
undisturbed, appears to be a successful strategy. It 
requires extra money from the company for the driv-
ers, which in turn needs a deep level of trust. Moreo-
ver, the drivers need special negotiating skills, 
because they are the ones dealing directly with the 
Taliban. However, the point about armed gangs some-
times claiming to be Taliban and forcing payment 
indicates that negotiations do not always lead to 
more security.
The CEOs concurred that Pakistani companies 
were supplying the Taliban areas. Whether this is 
true or not, this perception indicates a suspicious 
attitude about the role of Pakistan in contributing to 
insecurity in Afghanistan. This perception was also 
shared by some Afghans in Afghanistan but, as men-
tioned above, the same criticisms are voiced about 
the role of Iran in the Afghan conflict. Such state-
ments reveal a deep mistrust of the influence of the 
neighbours in Afghanistan, a distrust which often 
extends to exit options such as shifting the focus of 
business to other countries and deciding to remain 
located abroad. 
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Under the particular business conditions described 
above, transport companies are trying to minimize 
their costs and bypass formalities to bring profits back 
up to the levels enjoyed in the ‘NATO years’. Especially 
in the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan, 
the most effective way of doing business for compa-
nies is to find informal solutions for each step of the 
transport process. This presents a great challenge for 
conflict-sensitive employment strategies. In order to 
understand how the large informal part of the trans-
port sector works, we conducted interviews and dis-
cussions with individuals involved in the Afghan- 
Pakistan cross-border transport business in the bor-
der region of Torkham and the Peshawar district of 
the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan.
Components of the informal transport 
sector
Various types of actors are involved in the transport 
business, including day labourers, drivers, assistant 
drivers, truck owners and SMEs.
Afghan refugees and Pakistani day labourers 
work closely with transporters in the cross-border 
business. Such people are never hired for more than a 
few days; their jobs are directly dependent on the 
availability of work. Each day they make their way to 
warehouses, vegetable and grain markets in search of 
work. All loading and unloading is done manually. 
The idea of health and safety regulations or job secu-
rity in this trade is non-existent. Most labourers 
come from extremely poor families and do not have 
any skills; they work for food and around PKR 750 (US 
$7) per day. During periods when the Torkham border 
is closed, these labourers suffer most because they 
lack the mobility to find new jobs and have very little 
financial endurance.
The crew of a vehicle includes a driver and an 
assistant. They are responsible for both the physical 
transport of material and maintenance of the vehicle. 
Almost all drivers are informally trained as an assis-
tant, called ‘kalender’ (conductor). Depending on the 
period of employment and level of trust, assistants 
are eventually promoted to be drivers after a few 
months or years. 
The driver’s assistant is responsible for taking 
care of all jobs related to the vehicle apart from driv-
ing. The tasks include keeping the vehicle clean, tak-
ing care of transported goods on the road, helping 
drivers to make difficult road manoeuvres, helping 
with repairs, and procuring food and groceries along 
the way. Many drivers teach them each step just as 
they had been taught, thus the assistant refers to the 
driver as ‘ustad’ (master). Assistants usually start as 
young boys who might be related to vehicle drivers or 
owners. Many come from extremely poor families in 
Afghanistan or are Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Phys-
ical and sexual abuse of assistants by the drivers, 
police and others is considered normal in this trade. 
Hiring or firing of the assistant is as easy as stopping 
by a truck stop (‘adda’) and picking up a new boy from 
a poor family or even a runaway. Most of the time 
assistants are considered expendables by drivers and 
owners. Thus, for most assistants, the biggest incen-
tive is to learn the trade, gain the trust of an owner 
and become a driver. 
The driver is the primary custodian of the vehicle 
and most of the time he decides when and how to 
travel. However, sometimes more formally operating 
transport companies are involved in selecting secure 
routes and deciding timings and types of goods to be 
transported. There are also many small entrepreneurs 
who drive family owned trucks while others work for 
either families or companies. 
Family-owned companies and SMEs pursue a 
similar business model. Most of the SMEs lack any 
formal structure. Workers are hired and fired accord-
ing to need, and most of the business is done through 
personal contacts and verbal promises. According to 
our interviews with transporters and owners of 
 family firms they do not directly interact with the 
Taliban or other insurgents but find, on occasions, 
their vehicles are taxed when passing through cer-
tain regions controlled by Taliban forces. Most family- 
owned businesses and companies claim not to be 
working with either the government or the Taliban. 
People involved in the transport business at this 
primary level do not see how the ever-evolving proce-
dures and rules of business relate to the unfolding 
conflict in Afghanistan and its repercussions in 
Experiences and views of workers and small hauliers 
in Pakistan’s insecure border area
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Pakistan. The majority of people involved in this busi-
ness report the problems and challenges directly 
experienced in daily life. Rarely do they have any 
knowledge of the causes of the larger problems and 
challenges. For example, when asked about the clo-
sure of Torkham border in May 2016 due to the diplo-
matic row between Pakistan and Afghanistan, many 
drivers had no knowledge of that development but 
were fully aware of the losses they were incurring 
and problems they would face if the blockade contin-
ued. Moreover, most respondents in the border 
regions along the Peshawar-Kabul route held clear 
views about the failure of governance, policies and 
law enforcement on the part of the governments of 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
The high degree of informality of the cross-bor-
der business between Pakistan and Afghanistan is a 
consequence of the perception of hauliers that the 
border regulations are obstacles to their business 
rather than opportunities. The informality reaches 
from the very bottom of the transport business up to 
the top. Most private Pakistani-Afghan transit is pro-
cured and processed through informal channels with 
formalities completed only where they cannot be 
avoided. These practices have causes in the FCAS 
found throughout the border areas between Pakistan 
and Afghanistan. In contrast to operations across the 
Afghan-Pakistani border, the business between Paki-
stan and the Central Asian republics, where border 
areas are fully under state control, is strongly formal-
ized. All the vehicles used for the transit are processed 
and legally documented through procedures pre-
scribed by the APTTA. 
In a context where state policies are not reliably 
implemented and formal corporate structures are 
absent, the informal transport business between 
Pakistan and Afghanistan is characterized by func-
tionally independent components. Informal haulage 
businesses and workers only operate interdepen-
dently in their working practices when it comes to 
hiring and sharing knowledge about check points 
and corrupt officers. These limitations aside, the busi-
nesses in the transport sector operate according to 
the free market philosophy. The culture of informal-
ity is evident in each step done within business. 
Business structures in informal 
cross-border transport
Most business in the Pakistani-Afghan cross-border 
trade is carried out by small-scale transporters, who 
might own a single or up to a dozen vehicles. These 
businesses are generally family-owned with family 
members working as drivers or assistants. Investors 
or local merchants approach a commission agent 
located in Pakistan to arrange the shipment of goods, 
or they approach the truckers directly and reach an 
agreement over fares and types of goods. The truckers 
drive to Pakistan and call the commission agent, who 
in turn procures the goods for them in advance. The 
reason why a commission agent is involved is that 
there is no formal documentation other than simple 
book-keeping between the parties. Consequently, 
there must be personal contact between the truckers 
and the agent, and the party providing the goods 
must also trust the commission agents. The pay-
ments are usually handled through informal agree-
ments called hundi, under which commission agents 
are responsible for the truckers while the truckers are 
responsible for the purchasing party in Afghanistan.
Although truckers carry any material needed on 
the other side of the border, they usually specialize in 
a few specific goods that they prefer due to existing 
connections of trust and familiarity. The type of goods 
they load affects the way they have to bribe the Levi (a 
tribal militia in Khyber Agency region) or the police 
on route. Both the Levi and the police have their own 
extortion rates, usually ranging from PKR 300 to 1,000 
(US $2.80 to 9.40) at each security gate (‘phatak’). There 
are more than a dozen phataks from Peshawar city 
until the Torkham border, but the number keeps 
changing. The traffic police also have random stops 
within the cities where Afghan drivers are harassed 
for bribes. Near the border, the National Logistics Cell 
(NLC) (a military company) and Pakistan customs 
weigh the vehicles to determine taxes, duties and 
fines for overloading the vehicles. The weighing sta-
tion operated by NLC is ‘inoperable’ most of the time 
so that the drivers have to pay more at a private 
weighing station, or pay bribes to the customs offi-
cials for overloading. The allowed load limit for an 
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18-wheeler semi-truck is 37 metric tons, but most 
drivers reported that 37 metric tons is not even 
enough to cover all expenses of the trip, so they bribe 
the officials and load around 60 tons. The customs 
officials interviewed claimed that they could not do 
such things, because it is all computerized and the 
data is saved on official servers. After the paperwork 
and other procedures are completed and the due and 
‘undue’ payments made, the vehicles are allowed to 
cross the border. 
Reportedly, on the Afghan side the procedures are 
less complicated. The truckers pay the taxes and addi-
tional ‘payments’ and are usually let go rather easily. 
The return journey to Pakistan is again quite compli-
cated on the Pakistani side of the border. Here, many 
vehicles carry only fruits of the season or coal 
exported from Afghanistan, but many also smuggle 
in imported auto parts and scrap metal. The smug-
gled goods are barely hidden but the officials let them 
pass after receiving their due payments. The business 
has given rise to a huge auto spare parts market in 
the border regions and in Peshawar city. Most of 
these spare parts businesses are completely depend-
ent on the smuggled goods from Afghanistan. 
The trucks are unloaded and parked at a repair 
shop if they need any attention; if not, they are 
parked at a petrol station or a parking lot. However, 
some drivers either cannot find an adequate place to 
park or want to save money and thus pay small fees 
to the local police to let them park anywhere along a 
road in the city. A large number of Afghan drivers 
have families living in Pakistan so that they take the 
chance to spend their free time with them. Others 
stay in makeshift motels near their parked vehicles, 
as registered Pakistani motels are not allowed to rent 
out rooms to Afghanis without visas for security con-
cerns. Recent mass deportations of Afghan refugees 
and the targeting of Afghans by law-enforcing agen-
cies have increased the problems facing Afghan driv-
ers. It has become harder for them to travel through 
Pakistan, and many families are gradually moving to 
Afghanistan. 
Risk perception and mitigation in the 
informal transport business
Risk perception varies greatly between drivers and 
assistant drivers, truck owners and SMEs. Drivers and 
assistants interviewed claimed that they very rarely 
had any interaction with anti-government insurgent 
groups while working: “We don’t work against the 
Taliban and they don’t bother us” (interview of an 
Afghan truck driver, 2016). Most of the drivers and 
assistants were born into war and civil war or spent 
most of their lives within the long-running Afghan 
conflict. This is the norm for most people in the 
transport business. Many consider violence as a part 
of life and try to find ways within this reality to earn 
their living. 
The risks facing a vehicle assistant in cross-bor-
der trade are multiple: job insecurity, traffic acci-
dents, fear of physical and psychological harm from 
drivers, law-enforcement officers, and others. Few 
truck owners or transport companies know anything 
about their assistants, even who they are or how old 
they are. They are hired and fired by the drivers inde-
pendently. The assistants are paid PKR 5,000 to 10,000 
(US $47.70 to 95.40) per month along with commis-
sions per trip across the border. Family-owned busi-
nesses tend to appoint a young family member as an 
assistant. In these cases, the assistants are rarely paid 
any wages or commissions as they are working for 
the whole family. For them, risk perception thus 
focuses on getting a job and getting paid.
As for drivers, the idea of risk centres on working 
efficiently and looking after the vehicle, as the drivers 
are considered responsible for any damage to the 
goods and the vehicle. Drivers are paid a basic salary 
of PKR 10,000 to 20,000 (US $95.40 to 190.80) along 
with a commission on each trip. Most family-owned 
businesses and companies do not formally ‘employ’ 
the drivers but conclude verbal contracts and seek 
guarantees from mutual references. The reason 
behind this type of employment is there is little pros-
pect of legally enforcing liability, making any legal 
contracts futile. These verbal contracts are mostly 
agreed under Pashtun tribal customs and jirga (com-
munity council, mostly of elders) regimes, a far cry 
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from official judiciary systems. Drivers who have 
been fired by truck owners cannot easily find another 
job in the transport business, as they are considered 
unreliable by the whole community. 
According to interviews with truck crews, insur-
gents very rarely target or even communicate with 
the crews. However, most crews that belonged to 
Pashtun tribes of eastern Afghanistan expressed a 
favourable view of the Taliban, as in the following 
example: “I would never work for infidels (NATO) 
even if I was paid double” (interview with an Afghan 
driver from Khost, 2016). Almost all drivers and assis-
tants interviewed did not consider violence and war 
to be a hindrance, but as part of their lives. According 
to some respondents, violence does affect them but is 
mostly seen as just the bad luck of getting caught in 
the crossfire. One Afghan driver reported that he got 
shot in the leg during a trip, when his truck got 
caught in firefight between the Taliban and the 
Afghan army. His assistant was killed during the 
incident. 
According to almost all respondents, the biggest 
problems for them were (uncalculated) bribery and 
physical violence committed by Pakistani police and 
Levi. Here it is important to differentiate between 
calculated and uncalculated bribery. Calculated brib-
ery is the agreed-upon amount set aside by the trans-
porters to pay off various agencies and power holders 
throughout the route. This amount is usually factored 
into the payments from the client, i. e. the import-ex-
port company contracting the transporter, and is 
considered fair play. Most drivers do not even con-
sider this as bribery. The fixed amount of money paid 
at several checkpoints, and for border-crossing proce-
dures is viewed as an normal expense for the route. 
The problem for most drivers concerns uncalculated 
and unpredicted bribery in the form of additional 
forced payments to the Levi and police along the way. 
Such incalculable sums can sharply reduce earnings 
and directly impact on a driver’s wages and their 
relationship with the owner, who has specific profit 
expectations from the use of their vehicles. 
Almost all Afghan drivers interviewed reported 
abuse and extortion by Pakistani police. According to 
interviews with a repair shop owner and a security 
guard, the extortion and harsh physical abuse of 
Afghan drivers and assistants by the police can be 
witnessed every day. Most drivers hold an Afghan 
driving license, which should be valid for driving in 
Pakistan, if they also have the route pass issued under 
the APTTA (2011). However, most drivers are unedu-
cated and have little knowledge of their rights within 
Pakistan. According to interviews with representa-
tives of transport companies, they do not even have 
any knowledge of the APTTA or its provisions for 
Afghan drivers. One haulier reported, “If the proce-
dure changes, we have to change the paperwork 
accordingly, but we don’t know what these papers are 
in reality” (interview with an Afghan driver, 2016).
The risk of doing business in the transport sector 
for both the larger transport companies and the fami-
ly-owned hauliers is primarily financial. They accept 
no legal or financial liability for the livelihood or 
safety of the crew. “The owners do not care if you live 
or die, they first ask about their trucks’ safety” 
(Afghan truck driver, 2016). Most businesses do not 
consider legal and taxation liabilities as part of their 
actual business operations, but as a hindrance to 
business imposed by the government. These obstacles 
are removed by making bribes or by cultivating per-
sonal relationships with government officials. 
Interviews with police officers, soldiers and Levi 
operatives revealed that most rules and procedures 
are flouted at every step of transport business in order 
to exploit the crew, owners and even investors. At the 
Torkham border, all commercial vehicles are ‘taxed’ 
by a strongman from the Afridi tribe. Although most 
people were apprehensive when it came to talking 
about this person, it emerged that each truck had to 
pay at least PKR 2,000 (US $19) to the agents of this 
powerholder, with the rate varying according to the 
type of goods being transported. A Levi operative 
reported in a private conversation that: “The drivers 
who do not pay are physically beaten and harassed 
until they fall in line, although it is unlikely that this 
person is operating without permission from the 
military or political powers in the border region” 
(interview in 2016).
Across the border, the drivers report minimal 
problems with the Afghan government agencies. 
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They have to pay a certain predetermined amount of 
money to police and custom officials there, too, but 
physical abuse and extortion does not happen as 
much as in Pakistan. Although some respondents 
reported that the Afghan law enforcement agencies 
behaved harshly towards Pakistani drivers. 
Open interaction with anti-government insur-
gents only happens when exporting raw material 
from certain regions of the eastern provinces, such as 
Kunar and Nangarhar. The drivers of such shipments 
have to pay taxes at Taliban checkpoints. According to 
the interview partners, this happened very rarely to 
trucks involved in cross-border business.
The informality of the cross-border transport 
business means that vehicles cannot be effectively 
insured by an insurance company. Indeed, most truck 
owners are not aware of the issue. Hence, the busi-
ness has developed a culture of indigenous insurance 
for trucks and crews. For example, the Dobandiwal 
tribe, like many other tribes heavily involved in 
transport, has a tribal or clan union with a fund into 
which a predefined amount of PKR 500 or 1,000 
(US $4.80 or 9.60) is deposited each month. This 
money is collected and spent on helping families 
who have lost family members or on vehicles follow-
ing road accidents. These unions usually also run 
repair shops for trucks belonging to the same tribe. 
They act as mutually beneficial local networks and 
form a major part of the transport business and the 
adda culture.
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The views and experiences of individuals involved in 
the informal transport business provide insights into 
an industry marked by very loose interdependency 
among its players and a tendency to skirt around 
government policies. It is hardly possible to imple-
ment any top-down policy and expect to achieve 
structural changes in this sector because it lacks the 
formal institutions through which policies could be 
applied on an organizational level. Norms that would 
enhance social cohesion and inclusion while also 
improving the security of people and property are 
only likely to become more entrenched in industry 
practices if the majority of actors can expect to gain a 
secure income from formalized employment arrange-
ments and experience the rule of law and legal pro-
tection as a reality in the work of legal authorities 
and law-enforcement agencies. These conditions 
cannot, however, be expected to occur in FCAS by 
definition.
A blunt answer given to the question of whether 
private companies can contribute to reducing violent 
conflict was, “Companies are doing business. How 
can they help?” (focus group discussion with Afghan 
CEOs of transport companies and importers in Mash-
had, 2015). In fact, companies will not ‘help’, but they 
may act in a conflict-sensitive way in their own inter-
est. For example, in order to avoid violent incidences 
on the route from the Iranian border to Herat, large 
transport companies send an Afghan assistant along 
with each Iranian driver carrying goods for the com-
pany. The assistant accompanies the truck up to 
Herat and takes responsibility for safe passage (inter-
view with the owner of a transport company in Herat, 
2015). There are a number of further measures already 
being applied out of necessity and these can be 
expanded. They include the following conflict-sensi-
tive employment measures that can prove useful as 
long as Afghanistan and its border regions retain the 
characteristics of an FCAS:
   \ Hire local people with the adequate language 
and cultural skills to guide transports through 
risky areas.
   \ Give local people opportunities as a driver’s 
assistant to prove their abilities, be trained on 
the job, and make a career as a driver, site 
supervisor or any other transport-related 
occupation.
   \ Improve on-the-job training in the company by 
enhancing learning from those with higher 
skills.
   \ Provide training opportunities for some staff in 
the neighbouring countries or, if available, in 
vocational training centres in Afghanistan.
In addition, companies focusing more on the trans-
port needs of private households and domestic firms 
and avoiding dependence on international clients 
and the government are thus pursuing a conflict-sen-
sitive business strategy, which can also include con-
flict-sensitive employment if it leads to more jobs for 
local people.
Further conflict-sensitive measures not yet 
applied by the companies in the sample, yet poten-
tially effective under the conditions prevailing in this 
FCAS, are the following:
   \ Take apprentices from vocational training cen-
tres into the company to develop their practical 
skills.
   \ Adhere, as far as possible, to the ILO standards 
for promoting decent work.
   \ Split apparently ‘lucrative’ but risky contracts 
among a number of companies and put pres-
sure on investors to reduce their risks by apply-
ing conflict-sensitive business and employ-
ment strategies.
   \ Support and strengthen transport company 
associations that lobby the government and 
confront its flaws and corruption. This pressure 
might even extend to joint organization (for 
example, when shipping non-perishable goods) 
of ‘strikes’, such as blockades using trucks and 
involving local communities in response to 
arbitrary extortion by corrupt officials. Such 
actions would strengthen demands for the 
dismissal of corrupt officials.
The above measures and strategies, whether real or 
potential, refer to large companies operating in 
cross-border trade between Afghanistan and neigh-
bouring countries. However, even the largest 
Ways of making employment in cross-border 
 transport conflict-sensitive 
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companies cannot achieve conflict-sensitive employ-
ment alone. They need an environment that is as 
supportive as possible. The various power holders 
along the routes regularly used by a company have to 
be involved, whether they are inside or outside the 
government. Usually, interaction is initiated from the 
side of those who want to extract money or other 
benefits from the companies. So transport companies 
often have to communicate anyway with these power 
holders or their agents. Some hauliers endeavour to 
convincing them that the communities along these 
routes will benefit from the company’s activities. 
Involving the local elders or community develop-
ment centres may be a first step to negotiate safe 
passage in return for staying at a local hotel, request-
ing local catering services for drivers and assistants, 
and using local mechanics for on-route repairs or 
local painters for renewing truck colours, etc. In 
those areas where local power structures are rela-
tively well-established, these ideas can be a step 
towards an inclusive and conflict-reducing employ-
ment strategy.
Other key actors that could promote conflict- 
sensitive employment include the chambers of com-
merce and industry, especially those which have 
established joint departments across the borders. 
However, as corrupt structures probably reach from 
the governments into these chambers, it is important 
to build alliances with individuals supportive of the 
interests of transport companies in developing con-
flict-sensitive business and employment strategies in 
order to generate sufficient influence to counter 
against those undermining these efforts.
The main promoters of conflict-sensitive employ-
ment strategies should, of course, be the governments 
of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, in particular, the 
respective ministries of labour and of industry of. The 
expectations raised in the ANPDF can be used as a 
starting point to lobby for implementation of trade 
partnerships that are conscious of the potential 
impact of companies’ employment strategies on con-
flict. As governments in FCAS usually consist of 
highly heterogeneous actors more so than states with 
a legitimate monopoly of force, it makes sense to 
build alliances between companies and specific 
government officials with a good record and no his-
tory of corruption with a view to eliminating bribery 
at borders and along routes. This can be a first step 
towards reducing what many CEOs perceive as the 
worst problem. Family and kinship relationships, 
ethnic or religious ties may help to establish alliances 
that will lead to pressure within governments to 
properly regulate the cross-border trade. As long as 
the political tensions between Afghanistan and Paki-
stan remain, Iran can be more strongly involved in 
efforts to create secure meaningful employment by 
leveraging its role as largest official importer. Trans-
port companies operating cross-border trade also can 
involve officers of the Consulate of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan in Mashhad to support con-
flict-sensitive business and employment strategies 
along with the licensing and visa procedures.
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The study has shown that employment as such 
depends on the demand for transportation and logis-
tics. Violent conflict plays a minor role compared to 
international intervention, which was of such mag-
nitude that it led to a period of thriving cross-border 
trade. Transport companies grew and increased ship-
ments to satisfy the demand of NATO, ISAF and a 
range of international agencies for huge volumes of 
imported commodities through Pakistan and—less 
legally due to economic sanctions—via Iran. Percep-
tions of insecurity by transport company owners and 
managers, both small and large-scale, centre less on 
NSAGs and more on the issue of unpredictable pay-
ments demanded by various government officials in 
the border areas as well as the harsher customs 
regime that has followed the reform of the customs 
system, in particular at the Afghan-Pakistani border. 
Whereas the reform may have been intended to for-
malize, digitalize and enforce customs rules and reg-
ulations according to the law, it is largely perceived as 
a measure related to the deteriorating diplomatic 
relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and 
thus a political issue. Although the ANPDF sought to 
enhance self-reliance and create better opportunities 
for Afghans to be employed instead of foreigners, 
these intentions have had little impact on the ground 
in the transport sector. For security reasons, compa-
nies already relied on Afghan drivers and assistants 
on routes passing through insecure areas. This has 
been a major source of youth employment. The survey 
suggests that informal or illegal trade replaces formal 
trade when transport companies perceive measures 
put in place by governments, under treaties or laws, 
as obstacles and barriers. As the fluctuations in diplo-
matic relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan 
show, the more hurdles are put up at the border, the 
stronger informal solutions become.
Another insight from the field research is that 
power holders controlling areas in Afghanistan or 
Pakistan contribute to uncertainties for transport 
companies. This can happen when they demand spe-
cial ‘taxes’, attack trucks when a company is sus-
pected of working for international forces or for the 
government, or make mafia-like arrangements for 
circumventing rules and regulations, thus distorting 
market competition. Entrenched corruption in the 
government lies behind the many opportunities for 
importers and hauliers with links to powerful per-
sons in the government to get away with low customs 
duties, enabling imported goods (mostly fuel) to be 
sold at dumping prices.
The study also sheds some light on the interests 
of the governments of Pakistan and Iran that shape 
their intervention or neglect, investment efforts or 
withdrawal. Changes in the nature of their engage-
ment are obviously related to larger international 
relations, such as the economic sanctions imposed by 
Western countries on Iran and the expectation of 
sanctions being lifted. Another factor is the difficult 
relationship between Pakistan and India, which has 
an impact on trade routes for Indian products avoid-
ing Pakistan and using ports in Iran and Dubai. Cen-
tral Asian interests are leading to the predominance 
of formal, professional border formalities and nearly 
total suppression of informal trade. Against the back-
drop of these developments, the once flourishing 
cross-border trade with Afghanistan’s neighbours 
diminished to a status of a temporary hub serving the 
demand of the international clients stationed in the 
country. Afghanistan now appears to be returning to 
the role of a marginalized playing field for larger 
regional actors pursuing hegemonic interests or 
seeking to balance interests in various directions. 
Afghanistan itself is a minor player here (see also 
Harpviken & Tadjbakhsh, 2016).
The study reveals that employment strategies in 
the transport sector vary between large and small or 
medium-sized companies. Both groups have in com-
mon the need to respond sensitively to changing 
market conditions and risks. Large companies 
employ a very limited number of core staff on long-
term or permanent contracts and flexibly bring in or 
drop sub-contractors, i. e. short-term contracted driv-
ers and other staff, as needed. SMEs or individual 
truck owners take market opportunities as they come 
and rely on the cheapest possible employment solu-
tions. As found in the Peshawar district, Pakistani 
labour conditions in this segment of the transport 
industry fail to meet the ILO standards for decent 
work in every respect. Indeed, they involve a range of 
Conclusion
AfghAnistAn’s cross-border trAde with PAkistAn And irAn \ E. GrawErt, r. Nusrat, Z. a. shah
38 \ bicc \ Working paper  4 \ 2017
exploitative and human rights-violating practices as 
the norm. Nor are conditions any better in Afghani-
stan, as anecdotal evidence suggests. They are par-
ticularly hard for casual workers offering their labour 
in areas where they have no family connections and 
networks (Grawert & Mielke, forthcoming 2017). In all 
these cases, those working at the lowest level of the 
transport sector are far too weak to form a trade 
union or any other kind of common interest group. 
The reason is the ‘functional independence’ of all the 
various actors across the industry. The strongest 
job-related link is provided by the tehkedar and adda 
systems, which operate as fluid brokering agencies 
rather than organizations representing workers’ 
interests. These harsh conditions and the adjust-
ments to them explain why workers and small 
self-employed entrepreneurs in the transport sector 
are far from perceiving violent conflict affecting their 
society as the outstanding problem affecting their 
daily lives. Threats and risks stem from a range of 
other actors and incidences but, in their experience, 
rarely from NSAGs. 
This leads to an initial, sobering, conclusion that 
this large group of informal workers in the transport 
sector cannot be reached by conflict-sensitive 
employment strategies unless there are large-scale 
projects in the region requiring the employment of 
high numbers of unskilled transport workers. Inves-
tors and companies involved in such projects, how-
ever, would certainly have to take steps to ensure 
conflict-sensitive employment.
Turning to the large transport companies, we find 
that some have experienced rapid growth and 
employed relatively high numbers of people to supply 
international forces and agencies in Afghanistan. 
That had led to a booming transport sector, a situa-
tion which could occur again should any of the 
planned large regional investment programmes 
materialize in the coming years. The above analysis of 
the mistakes made by companies and their develop-
ment of alternative strategies to keep the transport 
business running in times of rising insecurity pro-
vides useful insights into the ways of making busi-
ness and employment more conflict-sensitive. The 
analysis shows that cross-border transport 
companies already apply conflict-sensitive employ-
ment strategies largely of self-interest. For instance, 
they might employ drivers and assistants according 
to cultural criteria in order to facilitate safe passage 
through dangerous areas under the control of certain 
power holders. They might also seek to negotiate safe 
passage in advance with power holders in areas not 
under state control. The wide-spread reliance among 
hauliers on family members and relatives, rather 
than recruitment based on merit, has been driven by 
the need for trust in a hostile environment, although 
the study could not determine a conflict-enhancing 
or conflict-reducing effect of this practice. 
As governments in FCAS like Afghanistan cannot 
be expected to take strong initiatives and manage to 
enforce them, the research findings suggest the way 
forward is to form positive alliances through net-
works already in use, building on family and other 
personal relationships to reach into the chambers of 
commerce, consulates, ministries and higher eche-
lons of government. If such alliances gain strength, 
they may be able to gradually eliminate the worst 
obstacles posed by corrupted border procedures and 
extortion on transport routes. 
To increase employment and make it meaningful 
and conflict-sensitive, cross-border hauliers can, in 
pursuit of their own interests, develop their existing 
cross-cutting connections within society in a strate-
gic direction. This means better communication with 
community elders and power holders in the areas 
they regularly pass through with their shipments. 
These stakeholders have to be convinced of the need 
to support companies by involving workers along 
different parts of the route in activities required to 
keep the business going. These range from catering 
on the road to mechanics, and from hiring local 
labour temporarily to providing some of them with 
job opportunities and career perspectives as assistant 
drivers with large companies, if they prove to be relia-
ble. The practice of cross-border hauliers based in the 
neighbouring countries to hire Afghans who can 
safely guide their drivers through insecure areas is a 
small first step in the direction of conflict-sensitive 
employment which needs to be expanded creatively. 
The self-interest of transport companies in reducing 
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risks and uncertainties is the best driver for spread-
ing conflict-sensitive practices.
The findings indicate that there are still some 
research gaps with regard to understanding the 
obstacles preventing private sector firms from acting 
collectively and from applying conflict-sensitive 
employment strategies. However, the study does show 
that one such obstacle is a lack of information among 
some companies about conflict-sensitive employ-
ment strategies being pursued by others within the 
industry.
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